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I. INTRODUCTION
In the pilot episode of the hit television show CSI, Grissom says to
Warrick: “Concentrate on what cannot lie.  The  evidence.”1  Although
Grissom is a beloved figure in U.S. popular culture, the U.S. is cur-
rently unwilling to accept that evidence never lies.2  In stark contrast
to Grissom’s statement, the common law has a long history of allowing
criminal defendants to cross-examine and question witnesses provid-
ing evidence against them.  The right to confront an accusatory wit-
ness is reflected in the historical legal documents of Great Britain,3 in
1. CSI: Crime Scene Investigation Quotes by Gil Grissom, CRIMELAB.NL http://crime
lab.nl/quotes.php?series=1&season=99&episode=99&characters=Gil%20Grissom
(last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
2. Or, perhaps, more appropriately, the U.S. is unwilling to accept that those pro-
viding testimony never lie. Thus, although Grissom is most likely referring to
physical evidence, cross-examination can help to control mistaken and false testi-
monial evidence.  It may also lead to correcting mistaken interpretations of physi-
cal evidence.
3. See M. HALE, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 258 (1713)
(discussing the examination of witnesses as a means to ascertain the truth); 3
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Shakespearean writing,4 and even in the Bible.5  In the United States,
the right to confront was enshrined in the Sixth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution which provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . .”6  The right to confront applies at both the federal
level and at the state level (through the Fourteenth Amendment).7
Although there is some consensus that the Constitution grants
criminal defendants some right to confront their accuser, there is
much less agreement on exactly who must be confronted and for what
kinds of accusations or statements.8  Particularly controversial is
whether the Confrontation Clause requires a scientific analyst (e.g.,
from the CSI lab) to testify in criminal cases where such an analyst
conducts a test, perhaps using a machine or other apparatus, and then
prepares a report communicating the results of that test, and that re-
port (or evidence of it) is offered at trial against an accused.9
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts10 the Supreme Court held that
reports from forensic analysts were not exempted from the accused’s
Confrontation Clause protection.11  The prosecution in Melendez-Diaz
attempted to introduce the analyst’s report or affidavit of what he
found, alone, without presenting the analyst himself for testimony
and cross examination.12  The decision held that the analyst of the
narcotic substance found on the accused had to testify.13
But the Court left open multiple questions, not necessary to the
decision on the facts, including whether exceptions could be made for
certain, specific types of analysts, which specific analyst must testify
where several were involved, whether someone else from the lab—say
a supervisor—could testify instead, and whether an expert witness re-
lying on the report could obviate the need for confrontation of the ana-
lyst(s).14  Moreover, the continued vitality of even the issue
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373 (discussing the examination of wit-
nesses as a means to ascertain the truth).
4. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act I, sc. 1; WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY
VIII, act ii, sc. 1.
5. Acts 25:16. See generally Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140–41 (1999) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (acknowledging the historical bases of the Confrontation Clause).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra sections II.D–E, Part III.
10. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); see also John Wait, Another “Straightforward Applica-
tion”: The Impact of Melendez-Diaz on Forensic Testing and Expert Testimony in
Controlled Substances Cases, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2010) (“Taking into
consideration each new justice’s prosecutorial background, the future of
Melendez-Diaz is not clear or certain.”).
11. 129 S. Ct. 2527.
12. See id. at 2531.
13. See id. at 2542.
14. The many unresolved issues are discussed in detail below. See infra section IV.A.
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purportedly resolved by the Court in Melendez-Diaz (which is widely
regarded as a pro-defense decision) was called into question by the
later appointments of Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor (who has
significant experience as a New York city prosecutor)15 to replace Jus-
tices who voted with the Court in Melendez-Diaz (who did not have
significant prosecutorial experience). As a result of  all this, as we see
it, after Melendez-Diaz there were nine important issues16 still left
open about how the Confrontation Clause applied to the prosecution
using reports from forensic experts against a criminal accused at trial.
Just this last term, the Supreme Court was presented with the op-
portunity to tackle one of these issues in a case styled Bullcoming v.
New Mexico.17  In Bullcoming the Court was specifically asked to de-
termine: “Whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution
to introduce testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst
through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did
not perform or observe the laboratory analysis described in the state-
ments.”18 Melendez-Diaz left that issue untouched, since no attempt
was made by the prosecution to use an in-court substitute witness for
the analyst.  The evidence at issue in Melendez-Diaz was an affidavit
or report of the testing analyst.19
Only this somewhat narrow question was presented to the Su-
preme Court in Bullcoming. But the opportunity was there to address
many of the other nine issues we have identified.  Although prosecu-
tors, crime labs, law enforcement officials, defense lawyers, judges,
and  Evidence and Confrontation Clause scholars would have dearly
loved—indeed, needed—to see the Court tackle all of these broader
issues, there is an  argument of judicial restraint that counsels
against a court taking on issues unnecessary to the particular deci-
sion—issues that are not specifically raised, briefed, and argued in the
case before it—on the grounds that such excursions are likely to be
poorly thought out.20
It is not the purpose of this Article to weigh in on whether the
Bullcoming Court should have tackled these broader issues. There are
15. Office of the Press Secretary, Background on Judge Sonia Sotomayor, The White
House (May 26, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Background-
on-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
16. See infra section IV.A (discussing each of these issues in detail).
17. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
18. Bullcoming v. New Mexico: Question Presented, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.
supremecourt.gov/qp/09-10876qp.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2011) [hereinafter
Question Presented].
19. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009).
20. See generally Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (“A ‘longstanding
principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.’”  (quoting Lyng v. Nw.
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988))).
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benefits to both views.21 Rather, our purpose is to set out the nine
issues regarding Confrontation law as applied to scientific reports
that arise after Melendez-Diaz, and examine what, if anything, the
Court said or implied about such issues in Bullcoming. We will also
venture some tentative thoughts of our own on each of these issues,
and some consequences of the various possible views.
Part II provides some case law history of Confrontation Clause ju-
risprudence so that the issues may be placed in their historical and
analytical context.  Part III sets forth the facts, the lower court pro-
ceedings, and the Supreme Court decision, in Bullcoming.  Part IV
identifies the nine important issues that arose prior to Bullcoming
and discusses where they stand after that decision.  Also considered in
that Part are some consequences to law enforcement policy.  Finally,
Part V presents our conclusions.  Even though the Supreme Court in
Bullcoming chose to refrain from laying to rest most of the issues we
identify, we hope that this paper will, at least, add to the ongoing dia-
logue on forensics and confrontation rights, and encourage more work
in this important and developing area of law.
II. MODERN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Although the right to confront an accuser has a long history, the
modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in the United States has
developed over approximately the last thirty years.22  In this Part, we
will detail several modern, landmark Confrontation Clause cases in
order to provide a necessary background for the remainder of this Ar-
ticle.  We present the cases generally in chronological order, but will
depart once from chronology for thematic reasons.  The modern Con-
frontation Clause history begins with the case of Ohio v. Roberts.23
A. Ohio v. Roberts
In Ohio v. Roberts, a suspect was arrested and charged with crimi-
nal conduct relating to forgery and having stolen a credit card.24  The
state attempted to enter a witness’s transcript into evidence and the
defendant asserted that without producing the witness for trial this
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause.25  In determining
the relationship between the hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause, the Court stated:
21. See generally Jack Wade Nowlin, The Judicial Restraint Amendment: Populist
Constitutional Reform in the Spirit of the Bill of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
171 (2002) (discussing the pros and cons of judicial restraint and discussing po-
tential reforms of current judicial restraint doctrine).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 24–114. R
23. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
24. Id. at 58.
25. Id. at 59.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB202.txt unknown Seq: 6  6-DEC-11 14:58
2011] GRABBING THE BULLCOMING BY THE HORNS 507
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is un-
available.  Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate
“indicia of reliability.”  Reliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.  In other
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness.26
The Court, therefore, found that both unavailability and an indication
of reliability were required to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.27  The
Court would later modify its Confrontation Clause analysis in Craw-
ford v. Washington.28
B. Crawford v. Washington
In Crawford, the Court rejected its Roberts analysis.29  The Court
faced the case of a man, Crawford, charged with attempted murder
and assault.30  Crawford claimed self-defense, and the state wanted to
enter recorded statements from the defendant’s wife which would help
rebut the self-defense claim.31  The wife was not available to testify
because the wife had marital privilege.32  The trial court applied the
Roberts test and admitted the evidence because several indicia of reli-
ability existed: the wife was attempting to support her husband’s de-
fense not blame him; the wife was an eyewitness with direct
knowledge of the events; the wife was describing events which were
still recent; and the wife was questioned by a law enforcement officer
who was “neutral.”33  Although the appellate court reversed, the
Washington Supreme Court also found indicia of reliability, namely
that there was a great deal of overlap between the wife’s testimony
and the story recounted by the accused husband.34  The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and rejected the Roberts reliability
test.35
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia turned to what he understood
to be the original understanding of the Confrontation Clause.36  Jus-
tice Scalia suggested the primary evil that the Confrontation Clause
attempts to address is the use of ex parte interrogations as evidence
26. Id. at 66.
27. Id.
28. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
29. Id. at 60–62.
30. Id. at 40.
31. Id.
32. Id.  The court stated that the marital privilege “generally bars a spouse from tes-
tifying without the other spouse’s consent.” Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 5.60.060(1) (1994)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 41.
35. Id. at 60–62.
36. See id. at 50–55, 59–60.
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against a criminal defendant.37  Justice Scalia argued that by using
the term “witnesses”38 in the Confrontation Clause, the Clause was
meant to target individuals who provide some form of testimony: “[a]
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing
or proving some fact.”39  Justice Scalia noted that an individual who
provides an out-of-court, formal statement to an officer gives a form of
testimony, but the same individual who makes an out-of-court, casual
statement to a friend would not necessarily be giving a form of testi-
mony.40  Statements providing testimony (what the Court terms testi-
monial statements)41 are the type of statements which Justice Scalia
suggested were intended to be covered by the Confrontation Clause.42
Justice Scalia found that the Roberts reliability test was inconsis-
tent with his understanding of the original principles of the Confron-
tation Clause.43  As Justice Scalia stated, the Roberts test:
[D]eparts from the historical principles identified above in two respects.  First,
it is too broad: It applies the same mode of analysis whether or not the hear-
say consists of ex parte testimony.  This often results in close constitutional
scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core concerns of the Clause.
At the same time, however, the test is too narrow: It admits statements
that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of reliability.  This
malleable standard often fails to protect against paradigmatic confrontation
violations.44
37. Id. at 50.  Justice Scalia relied on the English authorities for this proposition. Id.
at 50–51.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 50–55.  Justice Scalia based this conclusion on historical and English
precedent. Id.  Justice Scalia also suggested that this understanding of the Con-
frontation Clause has been reflected in the way in which the Court has actually
applied the Clause in past cases: “Testimonial statements of witnesses absent
from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only
where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” Id. at 59.
43. Id. at 60.
44. Id.  Although Justice Scalia did not provide his own concise definition of every-
thing which could be covered by the term ex parte testimony, he clearly used the
term to refer to at least the formal, out-of-court statements of one party or wit-
ness provided to a police officer during questioning and for trial (such as those
made by Crawford’s wife) without the other party’s ability to question the wit-
ness. See generally id.  A general legal definition of ex parte testimony would
seem to cover formal testimony by or for one party and in the absence of the other
party.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines testimony as “[e]vidence that a competent
witness under oath or affirmation gives at trial or in an affidavit or deposition.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 703 (2d. Pocket Ed. 2001).  Justice Scalia defined testi-
mony as a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establish-
ing or proving some fact.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citing 2 N. WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).  Ex parte would nor-
mally be defined as “[d]one or made at the instance and for the benefit of one
party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely inter-
ested . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (2d. Pocket Ed. 2001).  Justice Scalia
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Justice Scalia acknowledged that reliability is one of the goals of the
Confrontation Clause, but the Clause grants primarily a procedural
right to confront.45  Indeed, the Clause does not simply insist that the
evidence be reliable, but that the reliability of the evidence be specifi-
cally tested by cross-examination.46  The Roberts rule, according to
Justice Scalia, substituted a judge’s determination of reliability for the
Constitution’s prescribed mechanism of cross-examination.47  Moreo-
ver, Justice Scalia argued that the reliability rule was too unpredict-
able48 and led to courts admitting evidence which clearly violated the
intentions of the Confrontation Clause.49
After Crawford, the Confrontation Clause analysis would turn on
whether the statement itself was testimonial.50  The Court did not
enumerate all potential classes of testimonial statements but the
Court did provide examples of what could be testimonial:
ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements . . . con-
tained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions; statements that were made under circum-
stances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial . . . .51
The Court made clear, however, that these were merely examples of
testimonial statements: “These formulations all share a common nu-
cleus and then define the Clause’s coverage at various levels of ab-
straction around it.  Regardless of the precise articulation, some
statements qualify under any definition—for example, ex parte testi-
mony at a preliminary hearing.”52  The Crawford analysis continues
did provide a nice list of equivalents to ex parte testimony and this helps define
the contours of the concept as he uses it. See infra note 51 and accompanying R
text.
45. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
46. Id. at 61.
47. Id. at 61.
48. Id. at 63.  For instance, Justice Scalia suggested that at least one court used a
test consisting of eight factors and allowed the judge to weigh them all and attach
importance to whichever she chose. Id.
49. Id.  For instance, Justice Scalia suggested that courts were mistakenly admitting
accomplice statements to authorities. Id. at 63–64.
50. Id. at 50–51.
51. Id. at 51–52 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This exact
language was also specifically approved by Justice Scalia writing for the Court in
Melendez-Diaz. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531
(2009).
52. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.  The “common nucleus” would seem to be formal state-
ments, with the government involved, where the declarant is aware that the
statements can be used for trial purposes. See generally id.  Thus, if person X is
interrogated by the police after a robbery and person X tells the police that per-
son Y stole the jewelry, then the Confrontation Clause protections should apply.
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to guide the courts,53 but the courts have also come to refine what
statements are testimonial.54  For example, in Davis v. Washington,55
the Court carved out an exception for statements made in connection
with an ongoing emergency.56
C. Davis v. Washington
As stated above, Davis established the ongoing emergency excep-
tion in Confrontation Clause cases.57  In Davis, the court consolidated
appeals from two separate state court decisions: the Washington Su-
preme Court’s decision in State v. Davis58 and the Indiana Supreme
Court’s decision in Hammon v. State.59  Both cases concerned domes-
tic violence.60  In Davis, the State sought to enter into evidence the
conversation of a victim with a 911 operator (made before police ar-
rived on the scene) in order to connect the accused to the crime.61  In
Hammon, the state sought to enter evidence of an account by the do-
mestic violence victim made after police had arrived on the scene and
after the perpetrator appeared under control.62  The Court found that
statements will not be testimonial if they are made during the course
of interrogation where the primary purpose of such interrogation is to
aid in resolving an “ongoing emergency.”63  As the Court said:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interroga-
tion under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.
They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is
no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.64
If, however, the same person X is merely talking casually with a friend and men-
tions that he knows that person Y stole the jewelry, and a passer-by overhears
person X’s statement, then the Confrontation Clause protections would probably
not apply because person X would not anticipate the statement’s use for trial.
However, such a casual remark might have been barred under a Roberts reliabil-
ity test if it did not seem reliable. See id. at 51–52 (discussing how a simple
casual remark may be barred under a reliability test).
53. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
54. See infra notes 55–90 and accompanying text. R
55. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
56. Id. at 822.
57. Id.
58. 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).
59. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
60. Davis, 547 U.S. at 818–20.
61. Id. at 818–19.
62. Id. at 819–21.
63. Id. at 822.
64. Id. (emphasis added).  This same passage from Davis was recently cited with ap-
proval by the Court. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1154 (2011).
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Applying this exception to the facts, the Court found that the state-
ments in Davis, made during the 911 call and before the officers ar-
rived on the scene, helped resolve an ongoing emergency and were
therefore nontestimonial.65  By contrast the statements made in Ham-
mon were deemed testimonial because they were made to officers al-
ready on the scene (when the perpetrator was under control) and were
not primarily concerned with an ongoing emergency.66  The Court fur-
ther clarified the distinction between Davis and Hammon, and ex-
pounded upon the category of cases which are nontestimonial, in
Michigan v. Bryant.67
D. Michigan v. Bryant
In Bryant, the Court built upon its ongoing emergency concept.  Al-
though Bryant is a much more recent case than Melendez-Diaz v. Mas-
sachusetts, we will cover Bryant first because Bryant is more closely
related to Davis and Hammon and Melendez-Diaz is more closely re-
lated to Bullcoming (the subject of Part III).
The victim in Bryant was discovered mortally wounded and made
statements to the police.68  These statements, describing the shooter
and the location and time of the shooting, were admitted into evidence
against the defendant, Richard Bryant, even though the victim was
not available and was not cross-examined.69  Bryant was convicted by
a jury of, among other things, second-degree murder.70  The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether admis-
sion of the victim’s statements was barred by the Confrontation
Clause.71
In its opinion, the Supreme Court cited Davis and Hammon for the
proposition that not all statements in response to questions from po-
lice officers were necessarily testimonial.72  The Court noted that
statements made under circumstances suggesting the primary pur-
pose was to assist an ongoing emergency were a form of nontestmonial
statements made to police officers.73  The Court approved the distinc-
tion between the nontestimonial statements in Davis (where an ongo-
ing emergency was present) and the testimonial statements in
Hammon (where no ongoing emergency existed).74  The Court stated
65. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827–31.
66. Id.
67. 131 S. Ct. 1143.
68. Id. at 1150.
69. Id. at 1150–52.
70. Id. at 1150.
71. Id. at 1152.
72. Id. at 1154–56.
73. Id.
74. Id.  For a more thorough discussion of the circumstances presented in Davis and
Hammon, see supra section II.C.
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that the application of the Confrontation Clause normally turned on
whether the objective, primary purpose of making or eliciting the
statement was for use at trial.75  The Court then stated that aiding in
ongoing emergencies is one of the most important circumstances sug-
gesting that the primary purpose of the statements during the investi-
gation was not to provide trial testimony, but that an ongoing
emergency was not the only relevant circumstance.76  In making the
determination of whether the primary purpose is to provide testimony
for trial, the Court will objectively evaluate all the circumstances77
and considers multiple factors, including: the actions and motivations
of the public official and the declarant,78 reliability,79 formality,80 and
75. Id. at 1154–56.
76. Id. at 1155–57, 1162–63.  Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Court, did not ven-
ture much speculation as to what other situations would lead to the conclusion
that statements made were not the equivalent of trial testimony. Id.  If we had to
speculate, we would assume that Justice Sotomayor wanted to both reserve the
possibility of finding future factual circumstances as giving rise to nontestimonial
statements and reformulate the testimonial or nontestimonial divide into a more
general test.  What types of statements will now be nontestimonial will depend in
part on how broadly the Court uses the new indicia factors established in Bryant.
See infra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.  A very broad reading of the new R
indicia may mean that a statement could be rendered nontestimonial simply be-
cause the investigator was not intending to ask the declarant with the motivation
for eliciting trial testimony (even if the declarant intended the statement to be
testimony) or because the declarant did not intend to provide testimony (even
though eliciting testimony was the explicit intention of the investigator).  What is
clear is that by framing the ongoing emergency exception as one important cir-
cumstance indicating that the primary purpose was not to give testimony, the
Court seemed to suggest that a good deal more classes of statements may now be
found nontestimonial.
77. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156.
78. Id. at 1160–61.
79. Id. at 1157–58.  Justice Sotomayor’s inclusion of reliability is somewhat perplex-
ing.  First, it is unclear how reliability bears on the statement’s purpose.  The
purpose of the statement and the reliability of the statement seem like two sepa-
rate considerations.  Second, it is unclear whether the inclusion of reliability was
an attempt to move the Court back toward the standard as set in Roberts. See
supra section II.A.  If the Court wishes to move back toward Roberts, it is unclear
why the Court would retain the “testimonial” or “nontestimonial” language.
Third, and finally, the inclusion of reliability is surprising given how critical the
Court was of “reliability” in Crawford.  As discussed above, the Court criticized
the Roberts test based on reliability because the Court believed that the Confron-
tation Clause granted a procedural right to cross-examine rather than a right to
credible evidence. See supra section II.B.  The Court in Crawford was also con-
cerned about use of reliability because the Court felt that a reliability standard
was too amorphous and could allow admittance of statements which should be
excluded by the Confrontation Clause (such as accomplice statements to authori-
ties). Id.  In her concurring opinion in Bullcoming, Justice Sotomayor suggested
reliability was a relevant but not essential component of the Confrontation
Clause analysis, with the rules of evidence as the primary means of ensuring
reliability. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 n.1 (2011)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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whether the statements will resolve the present activity or merely de-
scribe a past activity.81
On the facts of the Bryant case, the Court found that the objective
primary purpose was to allow the police to deal with an ongoing emer-
gency and the Confrontation Clause did not apply.82  Justice Thomas
filed a concurring opinion where he reiterated his commitment to de-
ciding Confrontation Clause cases on the basis of the “formality and
solemnity”83 of the statements (finding such formality lacking in this
case) in accordance with the historical rationale for the Clause.84  Jus-
tices Scalia and Ginsburg both dissented and suggested that it was
the intention of the declarant, not the investigator, which should be
80. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159–60.
81. Id. at 1160–61.
82. Id. at 1167.
83. Id. at 1167–68 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas made a similar argu-
ment in his concurring opinion in Melendez-Diaz. See infra section II.E.
84. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167–68.  Justice Thomas disliked the primary purpose test
and would instead focus on “the extent to which the interrogation resembles
those historical practices that the Confrontation Clause addressed.” Id. at 1167
(citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 835–836 (2006)).  In Davis, Justice
Thomas had argued that the primary purpose test was unpredictable in the same
way that the Roberts reliability test had been unpredictable. Davis, 547 U.S. at
834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The Confrontation
Clause, according to Justice Thomas, was intended to target practices developed
under Queen Mary which employed a “civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”
Id. at 835 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43, 50 (2004); White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361–62 (1992)).  In Queen Mary’s time, an oral examina-
tion would be made of the accuser and the accused and the results would be re-
corded, transmitted to the judge, and sometimes used instead of in-court
testimony. Id. at 835–36.  Justice Thomas argued that in Crawford, the Court
recognized that the language of the Clause and history would be better reflected
by a test which turned on whether the statement was testimonial. Id. at 836.
Justice Thomas specifically adopted Justice Scalia’s definition of “testimony” for
the Court in Crawford: “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the pur-
pose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id.  However, Justice Thomas sug-
gested that the plain wording of the Court’s definition of testimony requires
“some degree of solemnity before a statement can be deemed testimonial.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Citing to his opinion in White, Justice
Thomas contended that the Court’s opinions have consistently protected those
statements which are contained in formalized documents or which have been ob-
tained formally, and have not readily found non-formalized statements to be tes-
timonial. Id. at 836–37; White, 502 U.S. at 365.  Instead, Justice Thomas
suggested that the Court has moved away from a requirement of formalization in
order to foreclose the possibility of law enforcement easily evading the Confronta-
tion Clause by taking the statements informally. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 837–38.
While evasion prevention seems important to Justice Thomas, he contends that
the primary purpose analysis is overly inclusive and that the better approach
would be to focus on preventing admission of formal ex parte testimonial state-
ments which were historically abused. Id. at 838; White, 502 U.S. at 364–65.
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relevant.85  Moreover, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg suggested that
the Confrontation Clause would still apply to this case whether the
objective primary purpose test considered the motivations of the de-
clarant or the investigators.86  Justice Scalia also accused the Court of
creating “an expansive exception to the Confrontation Clause for vio-
lent crimes.”87  This exception, Justice Scalia suggested, will allow
emergencies to persist for Confrontation Clause purposes until officers
learn of a violent criminal’s location and his motive for the shooting.88
Justice Scalia argued that this is a dangerous precedent for the Court
to set because it will allow for the evasion of the Constitutional rights
of the accused by empowering investigators to gather many state-
ments while the accused is at large and then introduce them at trial
without producing the actual witnesses for cross-examination.89
Bryant represented the Court’s most recent word on the Confronta-
tion Clause prior to Bullcoming.  Approximately two years before Bry-
ant, the Court handed down its decision in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts.  We chose to present Melendez-Diaz last because
Melendez-Diaz has the most significance for our purposes. Melendez-
Diaz speaks specifically to the confrontation issues which will also
play a background role in the Bullcoming opinion, namely to what ex-
tent a scientific report should be considered a testimonial statement
85. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168–69 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 1176–77 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting).  For Justice Scalia, the declarant’s intention is vital because in the case
of out-of-court statements, it is the intention of the declarant to have his words
used to invoke action by the State which renders the statement sufficiently for-
mal such that the Confrontation Clause is implicated. Id. at 1168–69.  Further,
Justice Scalia notes that a declarant-based analysis works in all circumstances
(because some statements will be volunteered by the declarant and unsolicited by
officers and so an investigator standard would be inapplicable in such cases). Id.
Moreover, Justice Scalia suggested that adding in the additional motives of the
investigator makes it more difficult to parse “mixed motive” situations (situations
where the speaker has two or more motives for making the statement) because it
adds an additional set of motives to consider (those of the investigator). Id. at
1170.  Finally, Justice Scalia charged that allowing the motives of the investiga-
tor to transform the statements of a dying victim (who may only be speaking
informally and by reflex) into statements of testimony makes no sense. Id. at
1169–70.  Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice Scalia on these points. Id. at
1176–77.
86. Id. at 1171–72, 1176–77.
87. Id. at 1173
88. Id.
89. Id.  Justice Scalia provided a hypothetical to demonstrate why this is a dangerous
precedent for the Court to set. Id.  The police could gather statements about the
crime from witnesses while the assailant is still at large or while the motivations
for the crime are not yet understood. Id.  Thereafter, the police officers who
heard the statements from the witnesses could testify at trial from their own
memory without ever producing the original witnesses for cross-examination. Id.
Such a broad definition of emergency, which would cover the situation where the
location and motivation of the accused was not yet known, would thus effectively
rob the accused of his Constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id.
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for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause and to what extent a sci-
entific analyst is a witness for Confrontation Clause purposes.90
E. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
Melendez-Diaz provided the Court with the opportunity to consider
the Confrontation Clause in light of forensic reports.91  In Melendez-
Diaz, the police found four plastic bags which contained a substance—
appearing to be cocaine—on the person of Thomas Wright.92  The of-
ficers submitted the substance to a state laboratory, in accordance
with Massachusetts law, for chemical analysis.93  Wright was charged
with two cocaine-related crimes.94  At trial, the prosecution offered
into evidence three certificates which showed the results of the chemi-
cal analysis.95  The certificates reported the weight and size of the
bags, as well as the fact that the conducted analysis demonstrated the
substance contained in the bags to be cocaine.96  As required by Mas-
sachusetts law, the certificates were also sworn before a public no-
tary.97  The certificates were admitted even though the analysts
preparing the reports did not testify and Wright was found guilty.98
Wright appealed the conviction, asserting that admission of the certif-
icates without the ability to cross-examine the analysts violated his
rights under the Constitution’s Confrontation Clause.99
The Court (Justice Scalia, with Justices Stevens, Souter, and Gins-
burg) determined that the certificates consisted of out-of-court written
statements made by individuals not appearing in court100 and were
testimonial.101  Justice Scalia had “little doubt that the documents at
issue in this case fall within the core class of testimonial statements
thus described [in Crawford].”102  Justice Scalia noted that the Court’s
description of testimonial statements in Crawford mentions affidavits
twice and although the state of Massachusetts refers to the state-
ments in the present case as certificates, they are clearly affidavits.103
Justice Scalia argued that the statements were sworn and the func-
90. See generally Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
91. Id. at 2530.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2530–31.
96. Id. at 2531.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.  The Court’s opinion does not make explicitly clear exactly what role each of
these analysts played in conducting the tests and compiling the certificates.
100. Id. at 2532, 2542.
101. Id. at 2532.
102. Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id.
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tional equivalent of in-court live testimony.104  Moreover, Justice
Scalia stated that not only were the statements made under circum-
stances leading a reasonable person to believe they would be used at
trial, but also the sole purpose of the affidavits, under Massachusetts
law, was for use at trial.105  Justice Scalia concluded that the state-
ments were testimonial and that the analyst must be presented for
cross-examination, absent a showing of unavailability and previous
opportunity for cross-examination.106
Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion but wrote separately to
make clear that he believed that the Confrontation Clause only cov-
ered statements in “formalized testimonial materials, such as affida-
vits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”107  Justice Thomas
agreed with the Court’s opinion in this specific case, however, because
the statements were contained in documents which were sworn and
“quite plainly affidavits.”108
Justice Kennedy (along with Justices Roberts, Breyer, and Alito)
dissented and criticized the Court for using two cases which do not
mention scientific evidence, Crawford109 and Davis,110 to “sweep
away an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evi-
dence.”111  That long accepted rule, according to Justice Kennedy, was
that “scientific analysis could be introduced into evidence without tes-
timony from the “analyst” who produced it.”112  Justice Kennedy noted
that the framers of the Constitution chose to use the word “witnesses”
and therefore the Court should distinguish between laboratory testing
analysts and conventional witnesses.113  What Crawford and Davis
require, according to the dissent, is that formal statements of conven-
tional witnesses—those with some personal knowledge as to the guilt
of the defendant—are inadmissible unless the witness appears at
trial.114
104. Id. (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365
(1992)).
108. Id.  We have provided a more expansive treatment of the rationale of Justice
Thomas above. See supra note 83.
109. See supra section II.B.
110. See supra section II.C.
111. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Justice Kennedy
suggests that a line may be drawn between declarants such as those in Davis and
Crawford (who had seen or been the victim of the crime) and scientific analysts
who had no first-hand knowledge of the parties or events in the alleged crime. Id.
In some ways, this line is problematic because the analysts will have personal
knowledge as to the guilt of the accused (for instance, the analysts may be the
only ones who knows that the alcohol level of an accused is above the legal limit).
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Following Melendez-Diaz, many issues remained unresolved,115
most notably whether forensic analysts will have to testify in all situa-
tions116 and which forensic analyst or analysts in a laboratory will be
required to testify.117  Because the Court in Melendez-Diaz was
sharply divided (5-4 with one of the five being a concurrence) and be-
cause two of the Justices in the Court’s Majority opinion were replaced
by two new Justices (one of whom has significant criminal
prosecutorial experience)118 the stage was set for another landmark
Moreover, the line will be difficult to draw in cases where an analyst personally
comes to the scene to collect samples and conducts the test on the samples herself
because that would seem to blur the line between personal knowledge and labora-
tory reporting.
115. We will discuss all the unresolved issues, which the Court should clarify, below.
See infra Part IV.
116. For instance, it is not entirely clear from the Court’s opinion whether a forensic
analyst would need to appear if all she did was copy a machine print-out.  In
Melendez-Diaz, both the Court’s opinion and the dissenting opinion accept the
existence of a traditional exception for copyists. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at
2538–39; Id. at 2252–53 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Justice Kennedy points out
that the certified copies of records by clerks (called “copyists”) have long been
admitted into evidence. Id. at 2252–53.  These statements, according to Justice
Kennedy, seemed testimonial in nature and did require skill and care on the part
of the copyists preparing the copies. Id.  Justice Kennedy suggests that this copy-
ist exception evinces an intention on the part of the Framers to exclude uncon-
ventional witnesses (such as copyists and forensic analysts) from the
Confrontation Clause requirements. Id.  Justice Scalia and the Court accept the
existence of a copyist exception but do not accept Justice Kennedy’s analysis of
the exception. Id. at 2538–39.  Justice Scalia says that the copyist exception was
“narrowly circumscribed” and covered only the specific case of certifying copies of
records in the clerk’s office. Id.  The copyist exception would not seem to cover
forensic analysts under Justice Scalia’s reading of the exception, nor would it
allow for certifications on the part of the forensic analyst as to effect or substance.
Id.  It is possible that some form of middle ground could theoretically exist be-
tween the Court’s opinion and the dissenting opinion which would allow an ana-
lyst who was doing nothing more than acting like a copyist to avoid the
implications of the Confrontation Clause.  It seems somewhat doubtful, however,
whether Justice Scalia would be willing to extend the copyist exception to cover
forensic analysts making transcriptions (especially because analysts are nor-
mally conducting the actual test and making certifications about the test itself).
See infra subsection IV.A.2.
117. There are many cases where forensic testing involves the actions of multiple indi-
viduals. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544–45; see also infra subsection
IV.A.4 (performing a toxicology test could involve as many as five individuals,
each of whom could ostensibly speak to the reliability of the evidence).  If the
Court requires testimony from forensic analysts, it is not fully clear which of the
analysts must testify if more than one is involved.  Moreover, it is also an open
question whether a supervisor at the laboratory may be permitted to testify for
all the analysts she supervises or works with at the laboratory. See infra subsec-
tion IV.A.4.
118. As mentioned above, Justice Sotomayor is a former New York City prosecutor.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  Justice Kagan was an academic, gov-
ernment attorney during the Clinton Whitehouse, and Solicitor General. See
Sheryl Gay Stolberg et al., A Climb Marked By Confidence And Canniness, N.Y.
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opinion by the Court.  That opportunity came along this past term in
Bullcoming v. New Mexico.119  In Bullcoming, the Court was asked to
decide “[w]hether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to
introduce testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst
through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did
not perform or observe the laboratory analysis described in the state-
ments.”120  The Court, if it chose, would have a chance not only an-
swer this question, but to reach out and clarify many issues left
unresolved by Melendez-Diaz, including the specific issues of when an
analyst must testify and which analyst must testify.  Whether the
Court in Bullcoming would in fact do so was another matter.
III. THE BULLCOMING CASE
Bullcoming came to the Court after the case had been decided by
the Supreme Court of New Mexico.121  In this Part, we will present
the factual circumstances in the Bullcoming case.  A firm knowledge
of the facts will be contextually helpful in understanding the issues
which the court could have clarified, considered in Part IV.
In Bullcoming, Mr. Bullcoming’s vehicle hit Mr. Jackson’s vehicle
from behind at an intersection.122  When Mr. Jackson got out of his
vehicle to exchange insurance information with Bullcoming, Mr. Jack-
son smelled alcohol on Bullcoming’s breath and noticed that Bullcom-
ing’s eyes were bloodshot.123  Mr. Jackson asked his wife to phone the
police.124  Upon being informed that the police were on the way,
Bullcoming left for the bathroom.125  After arriving on the scene, Of-
ficer Marty Snowbarger pursued Bullcoming and noticed him moving
rapidly and crossing over a bridge nearby.126
Officer Snowbarger finally caught up to Bullcoming and noticed in-
dicia of intoxication (including the smell of alcohol, watery and blood-
shot eyes, and slurred speech).127  Bullcoming was escorted back to
the accident scene and another officer, David Rock, also noticed indi-
cia of intoxication—including blood-shot eyes, the smell of alcohol, and
a sway while walking.128  Officer Rock asked Bullcoming if he had
TIMES (May 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/us/politics/10kagan.
html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
119. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
120. See Question Presented supra note 18.
121. See State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010), cert. granted Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010).
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 4–5.
127. Id. at 5.
128. Id.
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been drinking.129  Bullcoming admitted to having a drink at 6:00 in
the morning, but said that he had no alcohol since then.130  After fail-
ing a series of tests for sobriety, Bullcoming was arrested for Driving
While Intoxicated (DWI) and taken to the police station.131  Bullcom-
ing refused a breath test and Officer Rock obtained a warrant for per-
formance of a blood alcohol test.132  Bullcoming’s blood alcohol content
was 0.21gms/100ml, well above the 0.08gms/100ml legally
permitted.133
At trial, the prosecution successfully admitted into evidence the
Blood Alcohol Report (the Report) from the Scientific Laboratory Divi-
sion, Toxicology Bureau (SLD) of the New Mexico Department of
Health as a business record (an exception to the hearsay rule).134  The
Report contained several certifications135 and chain of custody infor-
mation.136  The Report was signed by multiple individuals: the ‘ana-
lyst’ (here, a Mr. Caylor) signed Part B, section 2 (certifying that the
sample was intact when received, that the laboratory broke the seal,
that the procedures set out in the report were followed,137 and that
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 5–6.
135. See infra footnotes 136–140 and accompanying text.  A full copy of the Blood Alco- R
hol Report appears as part of the Joint Appendix to the case. See Joint Appendix
at 62–65, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09–10876) [here-
inafter Joint Appendix].  The first page of the report shows all the original signa-
tures as well as Part A and Part B, which are discussed below. Id. at 62.  The
chain of custody information and procedures are also available from the report.
Id. at 62–65.
136. The chain of custody information is contained in Part A and Part B of the Report.
Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 6.  The chain of custody information in Part A consists of
identification of the officer who made arrest, identification of the donor, identifi-
cation of the person who drew blood from the donor, and the time, date, and place
of the blood withdrawal from the donor. Id.  Part A also set out the information
the officer sought and where the results should be sent. Id.  The chain of custody
information in Part B consists of a certification of the specimen type, how the
specimen was received, whether the seal was intact, and whether the procedures
set out on page two of Exhibit 1 were complied with. Id.
137. The standard procedures are set out in the Blood Alcohol Report. See Joint Ap-
pendix, supra note 135 at 63–65.  The enumerated procedures are as follows:
1. The laboratory named on the front of this report is a laboratory au-
thorized or certified by the Scientific Laboratory Division of the Health
Department to perform blood and alcohol tests.  The agency has estab-
lished formal procedures for receipt, handling and testing of blood sam-
ples to assure integrity of the sample, a formal procedure for conduct and
report of the chemical analysis of the samples by the gas chromato-
graphic method ( ) (specify, if other method used)
and quality control procedures to validate the analyses.  The quality con-
trol procedures include semi-annual proficiency testing by an indepen-
dent agency.  The procedures have the general acceptance and approval
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the analyst recorded the results);138 a report “reviewer” signed Part B,
section 3 (certifying that both the analyst and the supervisor of the
analyst were qualified to make the analysis and that the procedures
were followed);139 and an “employee” of the laboratory signed Part B,
section 4 (certifying that the donor had been mailed a legible copy of
the laboratory report).140  The analyst, Caylor, who conducted
Bullcoming’s alcohol test, signed Part B, section 2, and prepared the
of the scientific community, including the medical profession, and of the
courts, as a means of assuring a chemical analysis of a blood sample that
accurately discloses the concentration of alcohol in the blood.  The same
procedures are applicable for samples other than blood if submitted for
alcohol analysis.  The analyst who conducts the analysis in this must
meet the qualification required by the director of this laboratory to prop-
erly conduct such analyses.  The supervisor of analysts must also be
qualified to conduct such analyses.  2. When a blood sample is received
at the laboratory, the receiving employee examines the sample container
and: (a) determines that it is a standard container of a kit approved by
the director of the laboratory; (b) determines that the container is accom-
panied by this report, with Part A completed; 64(c) determines that the
donor’s name and the date that the sample was taken have already been
entered on this report and on the container and that they correspond; (d)
makes a log entry of the receipt of the sample and of any irregularity in
the condition of the container or its seals; (e) places a laboratory number
and the date of receipt on the log, on the container, and on this report, so
that each has the same laboratory number and date of receipt; (f) com-
pletes and signs the Certificate of Receiving Employee, making specific
notations as to any unusual circumstances, discrepancies, or irregulari-
ties in the condition or handling of the sample up to the time that the
container and report are delivered to the analysis laboratory; (g) person-
ally places the container with this report attached in a designated secure
cabinet for the analyst or delivers it to the analyst.  3. When the blood
sample is received by the analyst, the analyst: (a) makes sure the labora-
tory number on the container corresponds with the laboratory number
on this report; (b) makes sure the analysis is conducted on the sample
which accompanied this report at the time the report was received by the
analyst; (c) conducts a chemical analysis of the sample and enters the
results on this report; 65(d) retains the sample container and the raw
data from the analysis; (e) completes and signs the Certificate of Ana-
lyst, noting any circumstance or condition which might affect the integ-
rity of the sample or otherwise affect the validity of the analysis; (f)
delivers this report to the reviewer.  4. The reviewer checks the calcula-
tions of the analysis, examines this report, signs the Certificate of Re-
viewer, and delivers the report to a laboratory employee for distribution.
5. An employee of the agency mails a copy of this report to the donor at
the address shown on this report, by depositing it in an outgoing mail
container which is maintained in the usual and ordinary course of busi-
ness of the laboratory.  The employee signs the certificate of mailing to
the donor, and mails the original of this report to the submitting law
enforcement agency.  6. The biological sample will be retained by the
testing laboratory for a period of at least six (6) months pursuant to reg-
ulations of the scientific laboratory division.
Id.
138. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 6.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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Report, which among other things set forth the result of the alcohol
test.  Caylor did not testify at trial because he was placed on unpaid
leave.141  Instead, the state offered the testimony of Gerasimos
Razatos, another laboratory analyst who played no role in the Report’s
preparation but who helps to oversee the blood alcohol program.142
Razatos testified regarding the Blood Alcohol Content of Bullcom-
ing and the laboratory’s standard procedures.143  Razatos worked at
the same laboratory, was a qualified expert witness with respect to
the gas chromatograph (GC) machines used, and was qualified to tes-
tify regarding the specific laboratory procedures employed in the test
of Bullcoming’s blood.144  Razatos testified at trial about the GC ma-
chine used to analyze Bullcoming’s blood,145 that any human could
look at the GC machine and record the results,146 and that the ma-
chine prints out results which are then transcribed into the Report.147
Bullcoming objected, under Crawford,148 to the Report’s admission be-
141. Id. The court did not explain why the analyst was on unpaid leave and it is cer-
tainly possible that he was placed on unpaid leave due to incompetence or even
wrongdoing.  On the facts, this could be a reason to support the need for cross-
examination.
142. Id. at 5–6.
143. Id. at 6.  Again, the procedures for this specific laboratory are described in the
Blood Alcohol Report. See supra note 137.
144. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 5–6, 9.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 6.  One way to understand how a GC machine works is to use a ball anal-
ogy. See Brief for the NACDL as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9–11,
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09–10876) [hereinafter
Brief for the NACDL].  Imagine that you are standing at the bottom of a driveway
which slopes upward. Id.  Imagine that you are blindfolded and that there are
many sports balls of different kinds at your feet (including wiffle balls, ping pong
balls, and one bowling ball). Id.  You need to determine which one is the bowling
ball but you are blindfolded. Id. You do, however, have a leaf blower. Id.  In
order to determine which one is the bowling ball, you use the leaf blower to push
the balls up the driveway and the one that does not move is the bowling ball. Id.
The GC machine does a similar thing except it determines the amount of alcohol
in the blood using such “separation science.” Id. at 11.
147. The New Mexico Supreme Court accepted that Razatos was qualified to testify
about these issues. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 9.  However, because Razatos played
no role in compiling the Report, one may wonder whether Razatos was actually in
a position to know whether the specific machine was in good working order, was
properly calibrated, and whether the machine was properly operated by the ana-
lyst.  Again, the fact that the specific analyst was placed on unpaid leave may
actually suggest incompetence on the part of the analyst.  Of course, it is cer-
tainly possible that Razatos would have been in a position to testify as to the
testing analyst’s incompetence because Razatos worked for the laboratory and
helped supervise the blood alcohol program. Id. at 5–6, 9.
148. Id.  The appeal was on the basis of Crawford because the U.S. Supreme Court did
not hand down its opinion in Melendez-Diaz until the appeal was pending before
the New Mexico Supreme Court.
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cause the preparing analyst was not present at trial for cross-
examination.
Bullcoming asserted that admission of the evidence without the op-
portunity to cross-examine the preparing analyst constituted a viola-
tion of Bullcoming’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.149  The
New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld admission of the Report because
the court found that forensic reports are nontestimonial.150  Bullcom-
ing then appealed his conviction to the New Mexico Supreme Court
and while his appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court handed
down its opinion in Melendez-Diaz.151  The New Mexico Supreme
Court accepted the case and then applied Justice Thomas’s opinion in
Melendez-Diaz (as the narrowest holding).152  The court acknowledged
that the Report was testimonial, notwithstanding that it was not a
sworn affidavit like the report in Melendez-Diaz.153  However, the
New Mexico Supreme Court found that the analyst preparing the re-
port was not adding anything new and was a mere scrivener.154
Therefore, because Razatos was qualified to testify as to the workings
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 7.
152. See id. at 7–8.  This means that in a case such as Melendez-Diaz, where the tie-
breaking vote is a concurrence, the New Mexico Supreme Court applied the opin-
ion of the concurrence (Justice Thomas) rather than the opinion of the Court
(which only had the five required votes with Justice Thomas concurring).
153. Id. at 8. The New Mexico Supreme Court did not find the lack of swearing in this
case made the statements nontestimonial because the state was attempting to
prove a toxicology level in blood in the same way as was done in Melendez-Diaz
and Crawford made clear “that the absence of oath was not dispositive in deter-
mining if a statement is testimonial.” Id.  (international quotation marks omit-
ted) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52).  More detail about Justice Thomas’s
opinion in Melendez-Diaz, including his views on formality, is presented above.
See supra section II.E; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text (evaluating
standards of admissibility for documents and statements as testimony in light of
historical abuse of ex parte testimonial statements).
154. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 8–10.  The derivation of a mere scrivener exception is not
fully clear.  The New Mexico Supreme Court cites to three federal appeals court
opinions for the proposition that “raw data” or data generated automatically by
machines was either not a statement, not testimonial, or that even if it were a
testimonial statement, the operator of the machine was not the declarant. See id.
at 9 (citing United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hamil-
ton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142–43 (10th Cir. 2005)).  Although not cited to by the New
Mexico Supreme Court, the idea of a scrivener exception may also have been in-
spired by the traditional confrontation exception for copyists discussed by the
Court’s opinion and the dissenting opinion in Melendez-Diaz. See supra note 116.
It is possible that the New Mexico Supreme Court read into the copyist debate
and believed that some common ground existed between Justice Scalia and Jus-
tice Kennedy in a situation where the analyst was doing nothing more than act-
ing like a copyist. Id.  The New Mexico Supreme Court may have believed that a
mere scrivener fell within the narrow copyist exception.
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of a GC machine and the specific laboratory procedures of the testing
laboratory preparing the Report, and because Mr. Razatos was availa-
ble to testify at trial, this was sufficient protection for Mr. Bullcom-
ing’s Confrontation Clause rights.155  The New Mexico Supreme Court
did note that the Report contained special chain of custody informa-
tion (going beyond the machine’s print-out) but asserted that
Melendez-Diaz did not require the in court appearance of everyone
whose testimony may be relevant to establishing chain of custody.156
As is apparent from the facts, Bullcoming raised issues not specifi-
cally covered by Melendez-Diaz, including which factual scenarios will
trigger the requirement for an analyst to testify, which analyst must
testify, and whether certain substitute witnesses will suffice.
Bullcoming also presented an opportunity for the Court to clarify sev-
155. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 8–10. As mentioned above, Razatos played no role in the
actual compilation of the Report from the analysis. See supra note 147 and ac-
companying text.  Thus, it is unclear whether he would be qualified to testify as
to the fact that the specific analyst conducting the testing actually complied with
the procedures or used the machine appropriately.  Moreover, it is not clear from
the New Mexico court’s opinion whether there was sufficient interaction between
the testing analyst and Razatos, such that Razatos could testify as to whether the
testing analyst was a good employee and normally conducted thorough tests.
156. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 9–10 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.
Ct. 2527, 2532 n.1 (2009)).  Specifically, the court stated:
[W]e do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony
may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the
sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part
of the prosecution’s case.  While the dissent is correct that ‘[i]t is the
obligation of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody,’ post, at
2546, this does not mean that everyone who laid hands on the evidence
must be called.  As stated in the dissent’s own quota-
tion, ibid., from United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (C.A.7 1988),
‘gaps in the chain [of custody] normally go to the weight of the evidence
rather than its admissibility.’  It is up to the prosecution to decide what
steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence; but
what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be intro-
duced live.  Additionally, documents prepared in the regular course of
equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records.
Id.  We believe that this passage, essentially stating that not every link in the
chain of custody must be shown in order to establish chain of custody and render
evidence admissible, is correct law.  But it is beside the point.  The question is
whether, if the prosecution does choose to strengthen the chain of custody proof
by addressing a link that it doesn’t necessarily have to address, it has to do so
with live testimony.  In Bullcoming, by introducing the certifications about links
in the chain of custody which links they did not necessarily have to address, the
prosecutors chose to address them.  The question then is whether prosecutors can
do so through certifications without live testimony.  The principle espoused by
the court that not all links need to be proved says nothing on that subject.
Strangely, the court seems to say as much when it notes, in the above quote,
“what testimony is introduced must be introduced live.” Id.  But the court does
not seem to recognize the implications of its own statement.  We think the court
in the footnote in Melendez-Diaz was similarly confused.
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eral other issues which remained unresolved in the context of scien-
tific reporting and confrontation.
The United States Supreme Court in Bullcoming issued a 5-4 deci-
sion reversing the New Mexico Supreme Court.157  The U.S. Supreme
Court determined that admission of the report without presentation of
the preparing analyst violated Mr. Bullcoming’s rights under the Con-
frontation Clause, absent unavailability and a prior opportunity to
cross-examine.158  Justice Ginsburg authored the opinion of the Court,
joined by Justices Scalia, Kagan, Thomas, and Sotomayor.159  How-
ever, Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Thomas, did not join the en-
tirety of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion.160  Moreover, Justice Sotomayor
authored a separate concurring opinion to specifically emphasize the
narrow scope of the Court’s majority opinion.161.  Although the Court
sufficiently disposed of the case before it, the Court did not clarify
many issues which remain unresolved in the area of forensic reports
and confrontation rights.
IV. OPEN ISSUES CONCERNING CONFRONTATION AND
FORENSIC REPORTS  WHEN BULLCOMING WAS
ACCEPTED FOR DECISION BY THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT
Immediately prior to Bullcoming, U.S. Supreme Court precedents
left several questions unresolved in the area of scientific testing and
the Confrontation Clause.  The New Mexico Supreme Court com-
pounded the confusion by spawning new conceptual debates, such as
exempting an analyst from testifying when he merely transcribes ma-
terial from a machine (the mere scrivener concept)162 and allowing
one witness to testify on behalf of another (the surrogate witness
concept).163
In this Part, we identify nine important issues related to the Con-
frontation Clause which arguably were unresolved, or not completely
resolved, as Bullcoming arrived on the doorstep of the U.S. Supreme
Court.  For each issue we indicate the extent to which we believe the
ultimate decision in Bullcoming addressed the issue, provide our own
thoughts on the issue, and attempt to present law enforcement
concerns.
157. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
158. See id. at 2714–16.
159. See id. at 2709.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
162. See infra subsection IV.A.2.
163. See infra subsection IV.A.4.
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A. Issues Needing Resolution as Bullcoming Reached the
U.S. Supreme Court
In this section, we will identify the nine issues which we believe
the Court could have resolved in its Bullcoming opinion.  Only one of
them was actually resolved by the Court.  Even if some of the other
issues appear to have been addressed by Melendez-Diaz, or were not
specifically raised by the facts of Bullcoming, the Court could have
nevertheless put doubts about such issues to rest by providing more
guidance in the Bullcoming opinion.  Such a single Court opinion—
representing the view of the Court as currently constituted—could
provide much needed guidance to state labs, prosecutors, defense law-
yers, and judges in criminal forensic evidence cases.  As stated in the
introduction, however, we are not saying whether the Court in
Bullcoming should have reached out and decided these issues——
there are arguments on both sides of the question of how far a Court
should go beyond the facts of the particular case—merely that these
are issues which need to be resolved by the Court sometime soon.  We
may say a few words about our preferred resolution for some of the
issues, but it is more important that the Court, at some point, provide
clear guidance on these issues and somewhat less important that the
Court resolve the issues in the way we would prefer.
1. Who is a ‘Witness’ for Confrontation Clause Purposes (Or is
That Irrelevant)?
Bullcoming was an ideal opportunity for the Court to reaffirm
what types of witnesses are contemplated by the Confrontation
Clause, and clarify what type of witnesses are extraneous to the Con-
frontation Clause analysis.
Justice Kennedy, in his dissenting opinion in Melendez-Diaz, sug-
gested that only traditional witnesses (those who perceived events rel-
evant to the crime, and not scientific analysts) are covered by the
Confrontation Clause.164  This “type of witness” analysis differs from
the Court’s “type of statement” analysis (that is, which statements are
testimonial and therefore covered by the Confrontation Clause).  Jus-
tice Kennedy argued that the Confrontation Clause does not refer to
testimonial statements, or any class of statements.165  Instead, the
Confrontation Clause singles out a class of person: “witnesses against”
a criminal defendant.166  Justice Kennedy argues that although the
framers’ intent is unclear with regard to who is a qualified witness, it
is at least clear that the framers did not contemplate that covered wit-
nesses included “an analyst who conducts a scientific test far removed
164. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2550 (2009).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2550–51 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
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from the crime . . . .”167  Justice Kennedy contended that his position
is consistent with precedent, as both Crawford and Davis involved
traditional witnesses (not testing scientists).168  Since Justice Ken-
nedy’s dissent raised an argument that could possibly have some trac-
tion with the new Justices coming to the Court after Melendez-Diaz, it
was incumbent upon the Court in Bullcoming to set the issue to
rest.169  If, however, the Court determined that focusing only on the
type of statement is appropriate in Confrontation Clause cases, then
the Court needed to explicitly dismiss the type of witness approach.
In the recent Bryant case, the Court’s rhetoric still revolved around
statements which were testimonial.170  This seemed to suggest the
Court would continue to follow a form of statement analysis, rather
than a qualified witness analysis.  The Bryant case did not resolve the
issue, however, because Bryant dealt with a traditional witness and
not a scientific analyst,171 and so the current Court had not spoken
explicitly on this issue in the context of scientific evidence.
In its Bullcoming opinion, the Court did address the issue of
whether form of statement or type of witness should govern in forensic
report cases.  Justice Kennedy in the dissent repeated his argument
that the Confrontation Clause was not intended to regulate the admis-
sion of “impartial lab reports, like the instant one, reports prepared by
experienced technicians in laboratories that follow professional norms
and scientific protocols.”172  However, the opinion of the Court specifi-
cally rejected the argument that scientific reports were non-adver-
sarial and re-emphasized the centrality of the Crawford analysis and
the classification of statements as testimonial or nontestimonial.173
The Court cited Melendez-Diaz as support for the contention that sci-
entific reports available for trial are testimonial and that the prepar-
ing analyst is a qualified witness for the purposes of the Confrontation
Clause.174
Therefore, in our view the Court adequately addressed and re-
solved this issue in its Bullcoming opinion.  The Court determined
that form of statement analysis would govern the Confrontation
167. Id. at 2551.
168. Id. at 2543–44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
169. It is difficult to find a principled distinction between scientific witnesses and
traditional witnesses.  For example, it is unclear that there would be a real dis-
tinction between an individual analyst who witnesses the results of a process
showing an incriminating fact (such as a blood alcohol level which exceeds the
legal limit) and a traditional witness who sees an incriminating fact (such as a
footprint connecting the accused to the scene of the crime).
170. See supra section II.D.
171. See supra section II.D.
172. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 2716.
174. Id.
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Clause in forensic report cases rather than type of witness analysis.175
In our view, the Court reached the best result in reaffirming its com-
mitment to a “form of statement” analysis.  Categorically exempting
forensic scientists from the Confrontation Clause makes little sense
because just as in cases where a traditional witness claims to have
seen a license plate or the time on a clock, the report of a toxicology
machine’s results may only be as trustworthy as the person who views
the machine’s results.176  Nor are we convinced that the framers in-
tended to draw a distinction between traditional and nontraditional
witnesses, and any such distinction is nearly impossible to draw on
any principled basis.177
2. If Scientific Analysts Must Testify, Should There Be a
Scrivener Exception and What Should Count as a
Scrivener?
When the U.S. Supreme Court took the Bullcoming case, an un-
resolved issue in the relevant Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was
whether some analysts, who might otherwise be required to testify,
would be exempted because they were mere scriveners of raw data.
In Bullcoming, the New Mexico Supreme Court suggested that the
analyst preparing the report was merely transcribing machine issued
results and was therefore a mere scrivener.178  Unsurprisingly, the
Petitioners in Bullcoming suggested that no such scrivener exception
exists.179  For some, even the bare act of transcribing a number from a
machine screen onto paper transforms nontestimonial data into a tes-
timonial assertion.180  Is a scientist, working for the state in connec-
tion with a case, who merely transcribes the results of a machine,
more like a person making an accusation or is she merely recording
neutral data from a machine?  Certainly there is a chance of error or
mendacity in such transcription.
Instead of explicitly addressing the merits of a scrivener exception,
the Court side-stepped the issue.  The Court noted that the analyst in
Bullcoming was not a mere scrivener because he made multiple certi-
fications of numerous facts beyond merely what the machine pro-
175. Id. at 2713–16.
176. Brief for Petitioner at 33–35, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011)
(No. 09–10876) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
177. Justice Kennedy’s argument for a distinction between ordinary witnesses and ex-
pert witnesses would be helped if he could find, for example, a historical case
where an expert in horseshoes who identified certain horseshoe tracks could sub-
mit his testimony in writing.
178. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713.
179. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 33–35.
180. Respondent’s brief discusses this issue. See Brief for Respondent at 18, Bullcom-
ing, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09–10876) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
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vided.181  The Court, without deciding, further noted that the
existence of a scrivener exception could prove problematic.182  Justice
Sotomayor in her concurring opinion specifically states that the Court
was not faced with, and need not determine, whether the state at-
tempting to introduce machine-generated raw data such as a printout
from a gas chromatograph (assuming an adequate chain of custody is
shown), in conjunction with the testimony of a qualified expert wit-
ness, was permissible.183  If what Justice Sotomayor meant was not
the printout itself, but an analyst’s report of the printout, her opinion
(whose vote with the Court was essential in the 5-4 decision), would
seem to leave room for a narrow scrivener exception in future cases.184
If, as we suspect, the Court intentionally reserved the possibility of
finding a scrivener exception applicable in future cases, the Court
could have provided some further guidance concerning who might
qualify as a mere scrivener.  Presumably, a continuum of types of
statements would be established with some being testimonial evi-
dence and others being nontestimonial transcriptions.  On one side of
the continuum (if such a scrivener exception were eventually found)
might be the situation where an analyst merely records raw data from
a machine (such as recording the number .21 as a person’s blood alco-
hol content).185  On the opposite side of the continuum would be the
situation, as in Bullcoming, where the analyst makes multiple signed
certifications contained in a formalized report.186  However, what
about the situations in the middle of the continuum?  Would an ana-
lyst be a scrivener if some de minimus interpretation is required to
181. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714–15.  The Court stated that Caylor, the preparing
analyst, went beyond merely transcribing machine-generated raw data by includ-
ing representations regarding human actions and past events. Id.  The Court
noted Caylor’s representations as to chain of custody, the performance of a test,
that proper protocols were followed, and that no conditions affected the integrity
of the analysis or the sample. Id.
182. Id.  In making the argument that the scrivener exception is a problematic con-
cept, the Court used the example of a police report which presented a purportedly
objective fact such as the print-out of a radar gun. Id.  The testimony of an officer
who was not present at the scene to witness the radar gun print-out, but who
otherwise was qualified as to the radar gun technology, could not satisfy a defen-
dant’s confrontation rights by appearing for cross-examination. Id.  The Court
argues that simply because a forensic report may be more reliable than the report
of an officer at the scene should not change the Confrontation Clause analysis.
Id.
183. Id. at 2722–23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  We do not see how this could conceiv-
ably present any kind of Confrontation problem unless what she means is not the
printout itself, but an analyst’s report of the printout.
184. Id.
185. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 180, at 18.  Although Justice Sotomayor
chose not to provide great detail on this issue in her concurrence, Justice
Sotomayor’s opinion could be read to permit such an individual to be deemed a
scrivener. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722–23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
186. See supra footnotes135–40 and accompanying text.
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read the machine, and he provides it in the report, even if no other
certifications are made?  For instance, in Bullcoming, the machine in-
volved is said to provide both a number and graphs (which allows the
analyst to ensure that the machine tested properly).187  If the analyst
merely reads and relates in his report the contents and meaning of the
graph but makes no certification of anything else, should this be
enough to make his report more than mere scrivening?  How many
and which type of assurances on the part of an analyst will render the
analyst a non-scrivener?  The Court at some point should provide clear
guidance.
We think any scrivener exception is inconsistent with the Court’s
approach to the Confrontation Clause.  A report recounting the results
of a machine is analytically no different than a report recounting the
color of a traffic light.  Both are fraught with the same kinds of credi-
bility concerns which can be tested by cross examination.  Assuming
both are made with prosecution in mind, they are both testimonial
under the logic of the Supreme Court’s testimonial approach to the
Confrontation Clause.
Nevertheless, there is a possibility the Court will, in future cases,
evolve a narrow confrontation exception for scriveners even though it
seems inconsistent with the Court’s general testimonial approach.
This possibility remains because the majority opinion in Bullcoming
did not unequivocally rule out a narrow scrivener exception, as indi-
cated above.188  Justice Sotomayor, whose vote was indispensible,
seems to countenance the possibility of a narrow scrivener excep-
187. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 35 n.4; see also Brief for the NACDL,
supra note 146, at 12 (suggesting that the analyst must set the baseline for the
machine, that doing so requires comparing the sample to other samples and mak-
ing adjustments, and that such a process “is a wholly subjective task”).  Presuma-
bly, many such neutral machines require the interpretation of human analysts.
If the Court accepts that analysts’ reports of machine statements are not
equivalent to testimony, should interpretations of the analysts be testimonial?  If
so, that may mean that the state could merely introduce reports of exactly what
the machine said but not a report which places the number or graph into context.
Such a narrow scrivener exception, though, would serve very little purpose.  It
would not normally be needed because the prosecution could merely introduce
the machine printout.  This would not involve a confrontation problem, whether
there is a scrivener exception or not.  In many forensic techniques, the machine
printout alone or a report of a machine printout alone, may be useless in court.
Interpretation may be required.  For example, in fingerprints, DNA, and
voiceprints, certain things that show up on the visual displays may be disre-
garded by an expert as static or noise or other artifact or anomaly, which would
affect the ultimate conclusion of a possible match or no match. See generally
Brief for the NACDL, supra note 146, at 21–23 (discussing the interpretation pro-
cess of machine-produced results).  Should such a judgment by the analyst, ex-
pressed in his report, be part of the mere scrivener exception, or should live
expert testimony be required for the interpretation?
188. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB202.txt unknown Seq: 29  6-DEC-11 14:58
530 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:502
tion.189  Both the Court’s opinion and the dissent in Melendez-Diaz
recognized a “copyist’s” exception,190 which would seem analytically
tantamount to a very narrow scrivener exception.  A scrivener, then,
might include an analyst who merely transcribes what a machine has
said, although the utility of the exception embracing only such a “cop-
yist” would be minimal because in most cases, the machine printout
could be brought to court instead.  Would the scrivener exception en-
compass a report about bringing a sample to the machine?  What if an
analyst makes additional certifications such as “the machine was
working properly,” or interprets in more than a de minimis way what
the results mean?  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court suggests
that these would not be mere scriveners.191
3. In Determining Whether an Analyst’s Report is Covered by
the Confrontation Clause, Should It Matter Whether
the Statement is Formally Sworn?
Prior to Bullcoming, the importance of formally swearing the state-
ment in determining whether a scientific report will be testimonial
was murky.  As noted previously, Melendez-Diaz was a narrow opinion
(5-4) with Justice Thomas writing separately and casting the tiebreak-
ing vote.192  Justice Thomas emphasized that he only joined the opin-
ion of the Court because Massachusetts required that the scientific
report be formally sworn (rendering it equivalent to an affidavit).193
In Bryant, the Court re-emphasized the importance of some uncertain
degree of formality as one of several relevant factors, but again Bryant
was not a forensic report case.194  Is being sworn relevant to Confron-
tation Clause analysis, and if so, to what extent?
The Report in Bullcoming was not formally sworn, but was signed
and termed a “certification.”195  Some, such as the Bullcoming Re-
spondent, suggested that whether a scientific report is testimonial or
not turns in part on whether the report was formalized and sworn.196
The Bullcoming Respondent noted that in Melendez-Diaz, one of the
reasons why a majority of the Court found the statements in the re-
ports were testimonial was because the statements were formally
sworn and were thus functionally affidavits.197
189. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
190. A traditional copyist exception is discussed by both the Court’s opinion and the
dissent in Melendez-Diaz. See supra note 118.
191. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
192. See supra section II.E.
193. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009); see also supra
section II.E (discussing further Justice Thomas’s concurrence).
194. See supra section II.D.
195. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011).
196. Brief for Respondent, supra note 180, at 10–16.
197. Id.
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A focus on whether the statements in a report are legally sworn
holds some public policy attractiveness because it would aid legal cer-
tainty.  Yet there is something perverse about saying sworn state-
ments (which presumably have some guarantee of reliability because
of the oath and the penalty for perjury that attaches) are more suspect
than unsworn statements.  But perhaps the conundrum is explained
by the traditional Anglo-American distrust of authority and officially
garnered statements,198 or by the supposed greater credibility with
which juries view sworn statements, although we doubt that juries
really do make that distinction.  If the law treats sworn reports less
favorably than unsworn reports, then the state could functionally
evade the confrontation rights of a defendant simply by instructing its
crime laboratories to create only unsworn reports.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico did not seem concerned by the
fact that the statement was unsworn and accepted that the statement
itself was testimonial.199  That position on this issue was seemingly
supported by the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz (not
including Justice Thomas’s tie-breaking concurrence).200  This open
debate on the role of formality in scientific reports was a backdrop as
the U.S. Supreme Court wrote the Bullcoming opinion.
In Bullcoming, the U.S. Supreme Court held that statements con-
tained even in unsworn forensic reports could still be testimonial.201
Although Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence noted that formality
was not an essential component of the determination of whether a
statement is testimonial,202 her concurrence and the Court’s discus-
sion of formality at least suggest formality’s continued relevance to
the analysis.203  Without endorsing specific and exhaustive indicia of
formality, the Court suggested that the report in Bullcoming was suf-
ficiently formal because the statements were contained in a signed,
written report, which was headed “report,”204 and the report “contains
a legend referring to municipal and magistrate courts’ rules that pro-
vide for the admission of certified blood-alcohol analyses.”205  Thus,
although the Court did not provide specific guidance, the Court
seemed to maintain that some degree of formality would continue to
impact the Court’s analysis.
198. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44–47 (2004). See generally infra text
accompanying notes 227–35 (discussing the process by which forensic lab reports
are created).
199. State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8 (N.M. 2010).
200. See supra section II.E.
201. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716–17 (2011).
202. Id. at 2721 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 2716–17.
204. Id. at 2717.
205. Id.
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We believe the Court will eventually have to clarify the extent to
which formality affects the determination of whether a report is testi-
monial or not, and address more concretely the components of formal-
ity.  In our view, the Court was correct to find that swearing the report
is not central to the testimonial analysis.  There is little difference be-
tween a report that is signed by one or more analysts at a laboratory
and one which is signed and also formally sworn.  As long as the ana-
lyst compiles results into a formal report, signs the report, and pro-
vides the report to police officers or prosecutors in connection with an
investigation, this is sufficiently formal to be equivalent to testimony.
The Court did not sufficiently explain what degree of informality could
render forensic statements nontestimonial.  In our view, it would be
dispositive if a statement was sufficiently informal.  For instance, if
analyst X merely told analyst Y the results of a test over lunch (or
wrote a note to analyst Y of results on a paper napkin), these state-
ments should not be sufficiently formal to make them equivalent to
out-of-court testimony.206  Such statements may be unreliable under
the hearsay rules,207 but they should not be unconstitutional under
the Confrontation Clause.
In sum, the Court in future opinions should provide more guidance
as to what degree of formality is required to subject the statements of
forensic analysts to the Confrontation Clause.
4. If a Scientific Analyst is a Witness for Confrontation Clause
Purposes, Which Analyst Must Testify?
Prior to Bullcoming, there was a question as to which, if any, of the
forensic analysts involved must appear to support a forensic report.
The question included (1) whether one analyst (or a supervisor) may
testify as a surrogate for another; and, if not, (2) which of the some-
times many analysts involved in the report’s preparation should be
made available to testify.
i. The Surrogate Witness Question
Regarding the surrogate witness question, on one hand the Court
in Bullcoming could have decided to permit surrogate witness testi-
mony provided that certain conditions were met.  The Court could
have taken note of the arguably serious consequences for law enforce-
ment if the specific analyst must necessarily testify.208  If the Court
had permitted the admission of reports through a surrogate witness, it
206. An alternative approach might be to link the formality factor to the “purpose”
factor.  Under that view, the degree of formality would be a factor to consider in
deciding whether the purpose was prosecutorial use.
207. See generally FED. R. EVID. 801 through 807.
208. See infra section IV.B.  Respondent asserted that any analyst should be able to
testify for another. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 180, at 56–59.
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would also have been desirable to provide guidance as to who could
qualify as a sufficient surrogate and perhaps advise lower courts to
instruct the jury, as they assign weight to the report, to consider who
is and is not providing supporting testimony.209
On the other hand, the Court could have determined that surro-
gate witness testimony was never sufficient and that a defendant has
the right to be confronted by the specific analyst involved.  The Court
in so doing would have reinforced the notion that scientific analysis is
not neutral data reporting;210 but is instead subject to human er-
ror,211 report manipulation,212 or the intelligence and training limita-
tions of the specific analyst,213 and these must be tested in court.  An
example of the importance of cross-examining a specific observing wit-
ness was advanced by Mr. Bullcoming.214  Suppose that X witnesses
an altercation and that X assumes that Y started the altercation.  If X
tells his wife about the altercation (including that he believes Y
started it), then the wife may assume that X witnessed Y starting the
fight (rather than merely assuming that Y started it) and the wife
may testify simply that her husband saw Y start the altercation.
Cross-examining the wife in this example could not uncover the error
in testimony and only cross-examining X could.  In Bullcoming, the
specific analyst may have made mistakes or may not have been dili-
gent215 and Mr. Bullcoming may have wanted to cross-examine the
209. For instance, Justice Kennedy said that in the case of chain of custody evidence,
normally the potential holes in chain of custody go to the weight placed on the
admitted evidence.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2547
(2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Presumably, other sorts of forensic evidence
could be given to the jury and the jury could freely disregard the forensic evidence
if not supported by the in court testimony of the specific analyst.
210. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2533–37.
211. See Brief for the Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6,
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876) (“The fact that a
machine is used in the course of forensic analysis does not eliminate the specter
of human error.”).
212. For instance, what if mistakes were made, necessary steps skipped, or the ana-
lyst deliberately falsified the results? See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at
28–29; Brief for the NACDL, supra note 146, at 33 (recounting the story of a
police laboratory toxicology lab supervisor who falsified certifications concerning
an alcohol machine test and others in the laboratory helped cover up the
falsification).
213. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 30.  This means that there may be value in
interviewing the specific analyst even if the analyst has no memory of writing the
specific report. Id.
214. Id. at 21–22.
215. For instance, the analyst may not have been careful in bringing Bullcoming’s
blood sample to the machine.  The analyst may have failed to check if the ma-
chine was in good working order or may have misread the results.  Alternatively,
the analyst may have attempted to exhibit care when moving and inputting the
sample and when operating the machine, but the analyst may simply not be a
very diligent and careful person and may have made mistakes.
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specific analyst for that reason.  Both Mr. Bullcoming in the Peti-
tioner’s Brief216 and Justice Scalia in oral argument217 were con-
cerned with the fact that the analyst in Bullcoming was recently
placed on leave without pay (because that may be a reflection of the
analyst’s diligence or skill level).  The Court could have determined
that Mr. Bullcoming had the right to cross-examine the specific ana-
lyst for these reasons.218
In its Bullcoming opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court did in fact de-
termine that surrogate witness testimony was generally insufficient
and that the defendant normally had the right to be confronted with
the specific reporting analyst.219  In the Court’s words: “As a rule, if
an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, it may not be intro-
duced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the
statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity
to confront that witness.”220  Notice, however, that the Court seems to
characterize this conclusion as a mere general rule, suggesting there
may be exceptions.
Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, necessary for the decision,
specifically emphasized that Bullcoming did not involve a supervisor
who played any role, not even a limited role, in the testing or in the
preparation of the report.221  If a qualified supervising or reviewing
individual who was involved in the testing or report in some substan-
tial way was presented to give testimony at trial, Justice Sotomayor
suggests the outcome may be different:
It would be a different case if, for example, a supervisor who observed an ana-
lyst conducting a test testified about the results or a report about such results.
We need not address what degree of involvement is sufficient because here
Razatos had no involvement whatsoever in the relevant test and report.222
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion—which represented a necessary vote for
the majority, and without which the decision would have gone the
216. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 31.  The analyst might even have acted in
bad faith.  For instance, what if the analyst noticed a problem with the sample or
with the test after he had completed conducting the test?  A self-interested ana-
lyst may not have wanted to take the time to re-run the test and so might have
simply signed the assurances on the report to avoid having to retest and waste
his time.  Cross-examination could help illuminate such bad faith if bad faith
existed.
217. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705
(2011) (No. 09-10876), 2011 WL 719620 [hereinafter Transcript].
218. We are not suggesting that this issue should turn upon whether only faulty mo-
tives or lack of diligence is apparent from the facts of the case.  We are simply
suggesting that in Bullcoming there are factual reasons to question the analyst’s
performance level and such reasons exemplify why cross-examining the specific
analyst may be beneficial to a criminal defendant.
219. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714–15.
220. Id. at 2713 (emphasis added).
221. Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
222. Id.
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other way—could be read  to allow a limited surrogate witness concept
in future cases if a certain threshold of qualifications and involvement
is demonstrated on the part of the proposed surrogate.  In view of the
majority opinion’s allusion to a general rule regarding surrogate wit-
nesses and Justice Sotomayor taking pains to point out that the case
did not involve anyone who could conceivably qualify as a surrogate
witness, we believe the Court will eventually adopt a limited surro-
gacy concept.
ii. The “Which Analyst Must Testify” Question
Because the Court did not, however, adopt any concept of surro-
gacy, and instead determined that the specific analyst must testify, a
question arises as to which analyst must appear.
Scientific testing often requires the participation of multiple ana-
lysts.223  We conducted an informal interview with Dr. Michael Wil-
liam Cleman, Professor of Medicine and Director of the Cardiac
Catheterization Laboratory at Yale Medical Group, to determine how
a typical scientific laboratory involving toxicology analysis oper-
ates.224  Dr. Cleman informed us that a typical toxicology analysis will
begin with a first individual (e.g., a physician or nurse) extracting
blood or collecting a urine sample.225  The collected sample is then
sent by the first individual to a separate laboratory.226  The sample is
then normally received by a second individual at the laboratory and
checked-in (to ensure chain of custody).227  A third individual will
then normally be given the sample for testing.228  That third individ-
ual will conduct the test and then may enter the results into a com-
223. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2544–45 (2009).  The Justices
also raised this issue in the Bullcoming oral argument. See Transcript, supra
note 217, at 9.  Justice Kennedy in his Bullcoming dissent emphasized that mul-
tiple individuals are involved in forensic analysis (in DNA cases it can be as
many as forty), and in Bullcoming the opinion of each of the multiple participants
has independent evidentiary significance. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2724 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting).  As an example of the ambiguity of the Court’s opinion as to
which of the many involved analysts must testify, see Id.  Justice Kennedy sug-
gests that the Court’s analysis does not adequately explain whether each and
every one of the many individuals involved in making important certifications
must be presented. Id.
224. Dr. Cleman obtained his M.D. from Johns Hopkins University, completed his
residency at the University of Florida-Shands Teaching Hospital, and completed
his Fellowship at the Yale University School of Medicine. See Telephone Inter-
view with Michael William Cleman, Professor of Med. and Dir. of the Cardiac
Catheterization Lab., Yale Med. Grp. (Apr. 21, 2011) discussed in E-mail from
Michael Cleman, MD, to Ronald J. Coleman (July 31, 2011, 2:58 PM) (on file with
author).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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puter system.229  In some cases a fourth individual will be responsible
for interpreting the results that the third individual entered into the
computer and that fourth individual may be the one to create a report
of the analysis.230  Meanwhile, the laboratory will normally be over-
seen by a Laboratory Director.231  The Laboratory Director, a fifth in-
dividual, will be responsible for Quality Assessment (QA), which
entails ensuring that the machines are operating properly and that
the laboratory personnel are functioning appropriately.232  The Direc-
tor may or may not sign the report, but laboratory scientists and medi-
cal personnel normally consider the Director (or equivalent
supervisor) to be responsible for the activities of the laboratory.233  If
a typical toxicology test may involve as many as five individuals who
are all performing tasks requiring skill, attention, and some judg-
ment, then which one of these analysts should be required to testify?
If discovering human error or purposive misconduct is the goal for
requiring in court testimony of the reporting analyst, then it would
seem that all of the involved analysts must testify in order to ensure
such errors or misconduct are discovered.234  However, if all involved
analysts were required to appear, a good case could be made that sci-
entific testing in court cases may be effectively barred.235
One solution might be for laboratories to simply appoint one per-
son as the in-court representative to testify in all cases.  But this
would require that surrogate witnesses be allowed.236  In smaller lab-
oratories, a single supervisor may be able to actually observe or super-
vise all tests, and such observance may qualify that one supervisor to
be a satisfactory Confrontation Clause witness for everyone in the lab-
oratory.237  This really is the surrogate witness concept, and the two
questions (the surrogate witness question and the which of many ana-
lysts question) coalesce.  In larger laboratories, such actual obser-
vance will probably not be possible.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Assuming, that is, that they each provided an indispensible link in the chain that
produced the result contained in the report that is offered in evidence to establish
that result.
235. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2545 (2009).
236. Id. at 2545–46 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006)).  Alterna-
tively, it may be allowed by Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See infra
subsection IV.A.5.
237. Professor Richard Friedman, of Michigan Law School, argues that any analyst or
supervisor who observes the test may testify to the results without a Confronta-
tion Clause issue.  Brief for Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 9–10, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No.
09–10876).
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In Bullcoming, the Court’s opinion merely states (on the which an-
alyst question) that “the analysts who write reports that the prosecu-
tion introduces must be made available for confrontation . . . .”238 Use
of the word “analysts” is somewhat ambiguous and could be inter-
preted to either mean that (1) each of the analysts with involvement
in the process must testify, or (2) so long as at least one significantly
involved witness testifies, that will be sufficient to afford defendants
their confrontation rights.  The use of the phrase “analysts who write”
could mean the one who puts pen to paper.  But, in the quotation, it
says he must also be an analyst—i.e., he must be involved in the anal-
ysis process.  But how involved is not specified.
If the court intends option (2), we have difficulty in detecting a sub-
stantive difference between that approach and a strict conception of
surrogate witness testimony.  The Court will inevitably have to pro-
vide the states and laboratories with clearer direction concerning
which involved analysts may suffice.
The Court in Bullcoming could have explained whether surrogate
testimony would be permitted in any circumstances and, if so, under
what circumstances.  In choosing to adopt specific witness/analyst tes-
timony as the general rule, the Court could have provided guidance as
to which analyst or how many analysts are required to support a given
report involving multiple analysts.  But on the facts of the case it was
unnecessary, as there was  only one analyst with significant involve-
ment  and only this analyst was the subject of the petition to the
Court.
As indicated above, the Court in future cases may, and probably
will, adopt a limited surrogate witness concept, out of considerations
of practicality.  Although practical considerations should not ordina-
rily trump a defendant’s clear constitutional rights, the Court has said
repeatedly that the right to confront is a procedural right, not a right
to reliable evidence.239  Thus, the Confrontation Clause may grant the
defendant a right to confront a laboratory analyst, but would not nec-
essarily require all analysts who could speak to the reliability of the
evidence to appear.  All that may be required is some substantial basis
in cross examination for assessing credibility, not every basis.240  As
long as the defendant can confront one important supervising or ob-
serving analyst from the laboratory, who has some substantial in-
volvement or knowledge of the important steps used in the test
conducted, the Court may hold the defendant has been provided with
his procedural confrontation rights.  The reliability of the underlying
evidence (that is, the statements in the report itself) should be judged
by the rules of evidence and the jury.  Thus, the Court in future cases
238. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715.
239. See supra section II.B.
240. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
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may consider adopting a limited version of the surrogate witness
concept.
5. In Determining Whether a Separate Analyst Can Testify,
What is the Interrelationship Between the Surrogate
Witness Concept and Federal Rule of Evidence
703 (and Similar State Rules)?
As Bullcoming came to the U.S. Supreme Court, it was unclear
whether the Confrontation Clause was an obstacle to a familiar use of
the Federal Rules of Evidence (widely found also in state rules).  Rule
703, on its face, permits a qualified expert to testify in opinion form
against an accused, based in part on a forensic report of another ex-
pert who does not testify (even if the testifying expert had nothing to
do with the report or the analysis itself).241  But does this violate the
Confrontation Clause?  This question would have been squarely raised
by Bullcoming if Mr. Razatos had been presented as a qualified expert
giving his own opinion on Mr. Bullcoming’s blood alcohol level, based
in part on the report but also on some independent efforts of his
own.242  Rule 703 allows an expert to give an opinion based on other-
wise inadmissible underlying material (such as the report here), if
that kind of material is found by the judge to be reasonably relied
upon by experts in the field in their practice.243  In addition, the Rule
allows disclosure of that underlying material to the jury if the judge
finds that the probative value of disclosure in explaining the basis of
the expert’s opinion outweighs its prejudicial effect (the tendency of
241. Of course, Rule 703 also applies in the civil context and in the criminal context
when the evidence is not being used against a criminal defendant.  These con-
texts would present no Constitutional Confrontation problem. See generally FED.
R. EVID. 101 (stating essentially that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern all
proceedings in United States Federal court, unless the Rules provide an excep-
tion to the contrary).
242. For his testimony to have been presented this way under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Razatos would have had to meet certain qualifications as an expert,
and his testimony would need to have been soundly based on sufficient and relia-
ble information, only part of which could be the report done by the analyst in
question in Bullcoming. If an “expert witness” is a mere conduit for someone
else’s opinion or findings, with no independent input, the testimony is inadmissi-
ble under the Rules. See FED. R. EVID 702; Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105, 1109
(Colo. 1999).  On the facts of the case it is doubtful that Mr. Razatos ever could
have satisfied these evidentiary requirements.  If the expert’s testimony is based
on reading the actual printout of the machine, there is likely no confrontation
problem, at least as to the printout being considered testimonial.  It seems that a
machine statement cannot be considered testimonial.  There could be, at least
theoretically, confrontation problems if his testimony is also based on other
human certifications which could be considered testimonial (e.g., that the sub-
stance brought to the machine was from Bullcoming, that the machine was prop-
erly calibrated, etc.).
243. FED. R. EVID. 703.
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the jury to credit the truth of the underlying material).244  Thus, there
are two issues at work here: one is the opinion itself and the other is
the disclosure of the opinion’s underlying basis.  The issue of most in-
terest for our present purposes is the disclosure of the underlying ba-
sis, because the independent opinion of the expert itself is probably
(though not inevitably) sufficiently supported for confrontation clause
purposes by the expert being on the witness stand.245  The question,
then, is whether an expert testifying for the prosecution as to his opin-
ion, can introduce in support of his opinion, actual statements from
forensic reports he relied on, which statements would otherwise be
prohibited by the Confrontation Clause because the reporting analyst
does not testify.  In other words, can the expert witness (or more prop-
erly, can the prosecution in connection with the expert’s testimony)
constitutionally use the gateway provided by Rule 703 and similar
state rules, that allows underlying basis disclosure in the case of an
“independent” testifying expert who played no role in preparing the
report or making the test.  This is different than the surrogate witness
concept because the expert witness may or may not have had anything
whatever to do with the underlying analysis or report.  Even if the
expert was a supervisor, admitting evidence supported by the testi-
244. See generally id.; PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 522–38 (3d
ed. 2011).  If the underlying material is let into evidence, the judge is to instruct
the jury not to take the underlying material for its truth, but just to use it to
explain the basis of the expert’s testimony. Id.  It is questionable whether the
Supreme Court would accept that this feat could be done by the jury.  Whether
the Court does may be critical to whether the Confrontation Clause applies.  It is
an undetermined question whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to
statements offered for their truth, but there is some reason to believe that is the
case. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“The Clause does
not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the
truth of the matter asserted.” (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414
(1985))).
245. If for some reason the state’s version of Rule 703 were interpreted by the state to
allow an expert to base his opinion exclusively on the report of another who does
not testify, it is clear from what has been said of Bullcoming above, that this
would violate the Confrontation Clause. See supra subsections IV.A.4–5.  A more
subtle question would be whether the Confrontation Clause would be violated if
the report were not the exclusive basis for the expert’s opinion, but still an indis-
pensible part of the basis (without which the expert would have the opposite opin-
ion or be unable to give his opinion).  We think the clause would not be violated if
the other requirements were met.  For example, cross examination of the expert
could adequately alert the jury to possibilities of infirmity in this situation.  But
Bullcoming has nothing to say on this.  Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in
Bullcoming, however, may have an implication that it might be all right. See
infra notes 247–48 and accompanying text.  In a pair of recent decisions, one of R
them based on Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, this was held to be all right. See
People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 275 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090
(2011) (No. 10-8505); State v. Roach, No. 06-03-0342, 2011 WL 3241467 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 1, 2011). Williams is discussed infra notes 249–57 and R
accompanying text.
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mony of a supervising analyst as an independent expert is distinct
from admitting the same evidence supported by the testimony of a su-
pervising analyst as surrogate witness.246  The former requires not
only certain expert qualifications on the part of witnesses, but also
requires that they make an independent judgment based on more
than merely the report.  The latter may not require any of that, but
requires some involvement with the report or the test itself.
In Bullcoming, the Court chose not to resolve the Rule 703 issues.
Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence noted that the case did not im-
plicate a Rule 703 analysis because the state was attempting to intro-
duce the report itself rather than opinion testimony of an expert that
may have included discussion of the report.247  According to Justice
Sotomayor, the witness testifying was attempting to support the re-
port rather than enter his independent professional judgment.248  She
thus left open the questions presented here concerning expert testi-
mony and Rule 703.
In this connection, the facts of a recent Illinois Supreme Court
case, People v. Williams,249 which considered Rule 703 in a forensic
analysis situation, are instructive. In Williams, the defendant was
246. Brief for the States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12, Bullcoming
v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09–10876) [hereinafter Brief for the
States].
247. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2723 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
248. See id. at 2722.  Justice Sotomayor added that Bullcoming:
[I]s not a case in which an expert witness was asked for his independent
opinion about underlying testimonial reports that were not themselves
admitted into evidence. . . .  We would face a different question if asked
to determine the constitutionality of allowing an expert witness to dis-
cuss others’ testimonial statements if the testimonial statements were
not themselves admitted as evidence.
Id. (citations omitted).  She thus is a bit ambiguous about whether she is address-
ing the opinion itself, disclosure of the underlying basis, or both.  In addition, she
suggests there is a difference between allowing the expert witness to “discuss”
others’ testimonial statements (i.e., statements in the report), “discussion” which
she suggests might constitute permissible disclosure, and “admitting them into
evidence” in connection with  the expert’s testimony, which she suggests would
not be permissible disclosure. Id.  In our view, both a “discussion” and “admit-
tance” of the statements in support of expert testimony can be functionally
equivalent.  The real question should be the extent to which the substance and
contents of the statements are transferred to the jury and what kind of role the
statements are allowed to play with the  jury—regardless of whether the state-
ments are merely “discussed” by the expert or “admitted into evidence” in connec-
tion with his testimony.  If the distinction is, as Justice Sotomayor suggests,
between “discussion” of the statements and formal admission of them into evi-
dence, then we have placed form over substance. Under this distinction the prose-
cution, instead of seeking to “admit” the statements into evidence in connection
with the expert testimony, could have the expert discuss them quite thoroughly—
getting their substance into evidence just the same, but without the constitu-
tional trouble.
249. 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010).
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charged with, among other things, criminal sexual assault.250  At
trial, a police analyst testified to a likely DNA match between defen-
dant and the DNA deposited on the victim.251  This testifying police
analyst expressly relied in part upon her own analysis252 and in part
upon a DNA report compiled by a different analyst at a private lab253
who did not testify.254  The testifying police analyst was also allowed
to disclose the results of that private lab analysis.255  The Illinois Su-
preme Court upheld all of the police analyst’s testimony,256 and the
case is now before the U.S. Supreme Court.257
In cases such as this, the U.S. Supreme Court could find that Rule
703 empowers one analyst to testify for the prosecution and to disclose
the findings of a forensic test done by another—that the testifying an-
alyst played no role in compiling258—so long as the appearing analyst
is an independently qualified expert making a sufficiently indepen-
dent judgment.  In other words, the Court could take the approach of
the Illinois Supreme Court in Williams.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Williams will be the next big
decision in the unfolding story of forensic reports and the Confronta-
tion Clause, perhaps answering the expert witness questions left open
by Bullcoming. Taking its cue from Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
in Bullcoming—which, after all, was the swing or controlling vote—
the Court may well rule that as long as the witness is not merely par-
roting the conclusions of the previous analyst, a qualified expert wit-
ness can testify to her own sufficiently independently based opinion
without violating Confrontation rights, even if part of that basis is the
previous analyst’s report.  The Court may further find, in accord with
Justice Sotomayor’s implications,259 that some limited disclosure of
the report itself in connection with such an expert’s testimony may
also be permissible, if necessary to support the expert’s opinion.  The
court may also require that jurors be adequately instructed in some
comprehensible way that the report material itself can play only a lim-
ited role in their deliberations and should be heard with caution.  It
may be that the instruction, for confrontation purposes, will need to
caution the jury not to use the report statements for their truth, al-
250. Id. at 269.
251. Id.
252. She tested the defendant’s blood and derived a DNA profile. Id. at 271.
253. This lab tested the DNA left on the victim. Id.  The testifying police analyst also
reviewed this private lab’s work, and did the comparison of the two DNA sam-
ples, concluding there was a match. Id. at 271.
254. Id. at 270–72.
255. Id. at 284.
256. Id. at 287.
257. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (No. 10-8505).
258. An argument to this effect is advanced by the Amicus Brief of the States.  Brief
for the States, supra note 246, at 12.
259. See supra notes 247–48 and accompanying text.
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though we do not believe this untenable distinction (between taking
material “for its truth” and taking it as “explanation of the expert’s
opinion”) made by Rule 703 jurisprudence should be embraced by Con-
frontation Clause jurisprudence, at least in this connection.  In es-
sence, we are predicting that the U.S. Supreme Court will
substantially affirm most of the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in
Williams.260
The mere fact that a jurisdiction’s interpretation of Rule 703—or
even Rule 703 itself—would allow the evidence should be extraneous
to the Confrontation Clause analysis. The Court will make its own in-
dependent determination for Confrontation Clause purposes, as to
whether the above parameters are met.  The Court has previously
stated that whether the Confrontation Clause applies does not hinge
on the contours of the rules of evidence.261  It would indeed be strange
to allow a rule of evidence to render admissible, evidence that the Con-
stitution would otherwise prohibit.
If the Court does go down the road we think it will, it will need to
define, for Confrontation Clause purposes, the nature and quantum of
independent judgment and independent basis which is required to
permit testimony of an expert predicated in part upon the forensic re-
port compiled by another analyst.  Further, the Court will eventually
have to clarify exactly what is required to permit mentioning or intro-
ducing the content of the report itself in connection with such opinion,
how extensive that mention can be in various situations, and how its
reception can be properly limited in instructions to the jury.
In other words, the Court will need to inform lower courts and the
other players in the process, as to what it believes are the constitu-
tional uses of Rule 703 against the accused in the scientific reporting
context.  This should clarify the relationship amongst Rule 703, the
surrogate witness concept, and the Confrontation Clause.
260. We are predicting, from the Sotomayor concurrence in Bullcoming, that Justice
Sotomayor will join with the four dissenters in Bullcoming, to find no confronta-
tion violation in Williams, though she will not join in their reasons.  In a case
remarkably similar to Williams, one state court decision has already found there
was no confrontation violation because, based on Justice Sotomayor’s concur-
rence in Bullcoming, the court believed that is how the U.S. Supreme Court
would rule. See State v. Roach, No.06-03-0342, 2011 WL 3241467 at *4–5 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. Aug. 1, 2011); see also Rector v. State, 681 S.E.2d 157, 160 (Ga.
2009) (finding that testimony of toxicologist agreeing with results from report
prepared by doctor did not violate the confrontation clause). But see State v. Ara-
gon. 225 P. 3d 1280, 1283–91 (N.M. 2010).
261. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 14, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011)
(No. 09-10876) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)) [hereinaf-
ter Reply Brief for Petitioner].
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6. Should the Defense’s Own Right to Call the Specific Analyst
to the Stand Be Sufficient, With No Need for the
Prosecution to Present the Analyst?
Another question that could have been more effectively laid to rest
in Bullcoming is whether defendant’s right to subpoena the specific
analyst satisfies his confrontation rights.  Both the majority and the
dissenting opinion in Melendez-Diaz discuss the inter-relationship be-
tween the confrontation rights of the defendant and his ability to sub-
poena a scientific witness.262  The Court’s opinion in Bullcoming
suggested the defense’s ability to subpoena was irrelevant to the anal-
ysis.263  Justice Kennedy in the Melendez-Diaz dissent supported his
position that the analyst need not be presented, by noting that “if, in
an extraordinary case, the particular analyst’s testimony is necessary
to the defense, then, of course, the defendant may subpoena the ana-
lyst.”264  Justice Kennedy made a similar assertion in support of his
contention that the analyst need not be presented in his dissenting
opinion in Bullcoming.265
It does seem somewhat plausible that if the defendant is actually
concerned with human error or the misconduct of the specific testing
analyst, then the defense could simply subpoena the analyst or an-
other to impeach the credibility of the test report.  In many cases to-
day, the defense may not genuinely question the accuracy of the report
but may still seek to exclude it based on a Confrontation Clause
right.266
The Court in Bullcoming, in accord with these considerations,
could have adopted a rule that in forensic report cases, the ability of
the defense to subpoena the specific analyst (if the defense wants to
cross-examine him for some reason) obviates the need for the specific
analyst to always be presented for in-court testimony by the prosecu-
tion in order to admit the report.  Alternatively, the Court could have
explicitly reaffirmed the position that the defendant’s ability to sub-
poena the specific witness is wholly irrelevant because of the clear
mandate of the Confrontation Clause, that the defendant is to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him.267  Justice Scalia in
Melendez-Diaz stated that the right to subpoena a witness is not a
substitute for the right to cross-examine under the Confrontation
262. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540; Id. at 2547 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).  It is the Compulsory Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution that
gives the criminal defendant the right to summon and present evidence and wit-
nesses in his own defense. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
263. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719 n.9.
264. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2547.
265. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2728 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
266. Justice Kennedy also raises this issue in his Melendez-Diaz dissent. Melendez-
Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
267. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Clause.268  Justice Scalia’s statement is supported by the Court’s act
of sending Briscoe v. Virginia269 back to the lower court for applica-
tion of Melendez-Diaz.270  The Justices’ questions in the Bullcoming
oral argument also alluded to the irrelevance of the ability to sub-
poena.271  But, unfortunately, Justice Ginsberg’s reaffirmation of the
irrelevance of the defendant’s right to subpoena the specific witness, is
in the portion of the Bullcoming opinion which was not joined by a
majority of the Court.272  Although it may continue to be inferred that
the ability to subpoena is no substitute for the right to confront the
specific preparing analyst, the Court could have made this more
explicit.
In the future, the Court will probably reaffirm that the defendant’s
ability to subpoena is largely irrelevant to the confrontation question
(even if the state bears the cost of finding and subpoenaing the wit-
ness for the defendant).  The Confrontation Clause restricts the ability
of the prosecution to enter evidence without providing the defendant
her procedural right to confront the accuser providing such evi-
dence.273  The prosecution is therefore allocated the cost of finding the
witness and cannot enter the evidence if the witness is deceased or
unavailable.  If the Court stated that the defendants’ ability to sub-
poena the witness was sufficient to meet the Confrontation Clause,
the Court would be shifting the burden of finding the witness (and the
risk of the witness’s unavailability) to defendants274 and would be de-
nying them their right to be confronted with the witness.  If the ability
to subpoena satisfied the right to confront, there would be little need
for the prosecution to present any witnesses live, not just analysts (un-
less those witnesses provided some tactical benefit to the prosecution).
268. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
269. 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2009).
270. Briscoe presented the question of whether, if the state pays for it, the defendant’s
right to summon the analyst to the stand would obviate the need for the state to
present the analyst in court as a witness, and would allow the state to present the
analyst’s report instead. See generally Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d
113, 117–18 (Va. 2008).  The state’s payment could have been a reason which
distinguished the case from the holding in Melendez-Diaz that the defendant’s
right to subpoena did not obviate his right to be presented with the witness.  But
apparently the Court did not feel this was a significant distinction when it re-
manded Briscoe.  By sending Briscoe back to the lower court, the Supreme Court
was effectively stating that Melendez-Diaz could already act as authority for the
proposition that a defendant’s ability to subpoena does not satisfy the Confronta-
tion Clause, whether the state pays or not.
271. Transcript supra note 217, at 5.
272. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2718–19.
273. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
274. Although it is conceivable to limit the rule that a defendant’s ability to subpoena
suffices by saying that it suffices only if the witness is available for the defendant
to subpoena—i.e., not dead or beyond reach—and the prosecution pays all ex-
penses in connection with the defendant finding and presenting the witness.
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In such a system, the prosecution could enter written statements it
gathered, such as eyewitnesses to a murder, and the murder defen-
dant could simply subpoena the witnesses if the defense believed that
the evidence was defective.  Such a subpoena-based system is far from
our present system of trial, and the Court, in our view, will not counte-
nance this.
The Court could, however, adopt a more limited rule, allowing de-
fendants’ subpoena ability to play a more limited role in confrontation
analysis.  For example, the court could adopt a subpoena ability analy-
sis only in certain situations, such as cases of expert or scientific re-
ports.  However, based on the above discussion,275 it is unlikely the
Court would allow the ability to subpoena to totally obviate the obliga-
tion of the prosecution to present the analyst in such cases.  But de-
fendants’ subpoena ability may be one of the reasons the Court would
adopt a surrogate witness and/or expert witness approach to easing
the confrontation requirement in the case of scientific reports.276  The
ability to subpoena the basic analysts is precisely what would soften
any harm associated with the Court’s adoption of a surrogate witness
or expert witness “exception” to the need to confront the basic ana-
lysts.  It may also be a reason not to require all analysts who had any-
thing to do with a report to be presented by the prosecution.277  In
each of these instances, the Court may feel that cross-examination of
the person who is presented, when combined with the right of the de-
fendant to subpoena any others, may, in combination, sufficiently pro-
tect the rights of the defendant.278
Thus, in future cases, the Court may hold that defendants do not
always have a constitutional right to confront every single one of the
analysts involved in reports, because defendants can still use their
ability to subpoena in order to cross-examine analysts whom they fear
may have made mistakes in scientific analysis.
7. Should There Be Some Practical Time Limitation on the
Requirement that the Analyst Appear?
Prior to Bullcoming, an open question was whether there could be
any practical time limit on any duty of an analyst to appear in foren-
sics cases. Bullcoming did nothing to clarify the matter.
275. See supra notes 262–74 and accompanying text.
276. For the surrogate witness notion, see supra subsection IV.A.4.  For the expert
witness notion, see supra subsection IV.A.5.
277. See supra subsection IV.A.4.
278. Alternative or additional safeguards might be the right to argue to the jury that
there are potential infirmities if participants are not presented by the prosecu-
tion; and an instruction by the judge to the jurors, alerting jurors to such poten-
tial infirmities.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB202.txt unknown Seq: 45  6-DEC-11 14:58
546 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:502
Criminal investigations and prosecutions can move extremely
slowly.  Imagine, for example, that Colonel Mustard kills Miss Scarlet
in the Conservatory.  Professor Plum is investigating the murder of
Miss Scarlet and has Miss Scarlet’s body shipped to an autopsy facility
to determine the cause of death.  An employee of the facility performs
the autopsy and determines that Miss Scarlet was struck in the head
with a lead pipe causing her death.  Professor Plum knows that Colo-
nel Mustard was in possession of a lead pipe and wants to enter the
report of the autopsy employee into evidence at Colonel Mustard’s
trial.  Unfortunately, the court system in the state of Clue is slow and
so it takes time for Colonel Mustard’s trial to commence.  In the
meantime, the employee of the testing facility dies in a car accident.
Assume that the body of Miss Scarlet has deteriorated by now so that
re-testing to determine if a lead pipe caused her death is not possible.
If, following Bullcoming, the autopsy report is testimonial, and if only
the specific employee preparing the autopsy report will satisfy the
Confrontation Clause, then the autopsy report cannot be used to pros-
ecute Colonel Mustard.  In this way, Colonel Mustard will quite liter-
ally get away with murder.  At least one author has asserted that
“excluding the autopsy report where a medical examiner dies [some-
times] effectively functions as a statute of limitations for murder
. . . .”279  If the Constitution effectively imposes a statute of limitations
for crimes which otherwise have no statute of limitations, the Court
may want to rethink the implications of Bullcoming in a case where
time has caused this problem.  The Court’s opinion in Bullcoming
made no attempt to address practical time limitations on the require-
ment of the specific witness to testify280 even though the lack of such
limitations could prove extremely problematic.
If surrogate witness testimony is ultimately allowed,281 this prob-
lem would be diminished.  When one examiner died, another examiner
working in the same laboratory and involved in the process could (as-
suming he qualified for the surrogacy role) testify in the deceased ex-
aminer’s place.  Similarly, allowing expert testimony based on and/or
supported by statements from the report as discussed above,282 could
also diminish the problem.  Another less rational solution might be
merely to impose a time limit.  After a certain period of time, if the
analyst became unavailable for a legitimate reason, the duty to pro-
duce him would expire.
279. Carolyn Zabrycki, Comment, Toward A Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy
Reports Do Not Embody the Qualities of a Testimonial Statement, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 1093, 1115 (2008).
280. See generally Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
281. See supra subsection IV.A.4.
282. See supra subsection IV.A.5.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB202.txt unknown Seq: 46  6-DEC-11 14:58
2011] GRABBING THE BULLCOMING BY THE HORNS 547
8. Would the Analyst Have to Testify (If at All) Only When the
Testing/Reporting is Done for Purposes of a Legal
Proceeding?
As Bullcoming was moving through the courts, it was an open
question whether the Confrontation Clause is only implicated if the
forensic testing or reporting was done with prosecution specifically in
mind.283  Of course, this question did not present itself in Bullcoming
because the test and report in Bullcoming were obviously done with
prosecution in mind.
In both Bryant and Davis, discussed above, the Court said that if a
statement was not made with the objective, primary purpose to be
used at trial as a substitute for testimony, then the statement could be
admitted without violating the Confrontation Clause rights of the de-
fendant.284  Should that mean that objective statements in a report by
scientific analysts which are primarily made for purposes other than
legal proceedings do not implicate the Confrontation Clause?  Are
there any scientific reports that might be used at a criminal trial
against a defendant that could be said to have been made for other
purposes?  The answer is likely yes, but few (and not normally forensic
reports, almost by definition).  For example, there may be scientific
studies done by a University medical school well before any specific
case has arisen, about the nature of a particular mental illness, which
might become relevant for the prosecution in a subsequently arising
case involving the insanity defense.  In practice, however, most foren-
sic reports are clearly compiled with trial in mind (for instance testing
for DNA, drugs, alcohol, or skin under the fingernails).
Nevertheless, because there are instances like the University med-
ical school example and others, the question here is a real one.  In
light of the primary purpose formulation in Bryant and Davis, the
Court will eventually need to clarify the extent to which some tests,
studies, or reports may be seen as not having been done for legal/
prosecutorial purposes (and therefore perhaps evade the Confronta-
tion Clause), though the Court did not address this issue—and did not
need to—in Bullcoming.  In Bullcoming, the Court simply reaffirmed
its position in Melendez-Diaz: “An analyst’s certification prepared in
connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution . . . is testimo-
283. Finer distinctions could of course be drawn.  For example, is it the purpose of the
test or the report that is significant?  Are all legal purposes alike, or should we
distinguish among purposes of investigation, prosecution, trial, civil, and crimi-
nal proceedings?  What if there are multiple purposes, some non-legal?  What if
the test and report were done for another legal proceeding, or one of a different
nature than the one in which it is offered?  These are distinctions that could be
drawn in cases like Davis and Bryant, as well as the scientific evidence cases we
are considering.  There is virtually no elucidation of them in the case law.
284. Sections II.C–D.
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nial, and therefore within the compass of the Confrontation
Clause.”285  Subsequently, in footnote six of the opinion, which was
not joined by Justice Thomas and therefore does not represent a ma-
jority of the Court, Justice Ginsburg cited Melendez-Diaz for the pro-
position that business and public records would be admissible without
confrontation because such records were prepared without the pri-
mary purpose of proving or establishing facts at trial and were instead
primarily concerned with “administration of [the] entity’s affairs
. . . .”286  Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence suggested that where the
primary purpose of creating the report was medical treatment or diag-
nosis, the report could potentially be admissible absent confronta-
tion.287  Thus, although the Court’s opinion in Bullcoming did not
officially endorse a specific set of purposes which could remove foren-
sic reports from Confrontation Clause protection, the opinions of sev-
eral of the Justices who constituted the majority strongly implied that
several such alternative purposes existed.
The Court in Bullcoming could have better explained the extent to
which a reporting analyst need not testify if the test and report are
done without trial in mind.  The Court’s opinion could have, first,
given a clear pronouncement on the issue, and then, second, provided
guidance as to how to determine whether a given report requires con-
frontation based on purpose.  The Court’s opinion could have enumer-
ated a non-exhaustive list of purposes which might fall outside
Confrontation Clause protection, discussed the extent to which a
mixed motivation of medical diagnosis and trial could require confron-
tation, and suggested the degree of weight to be accorded the subjec-
tive intention and belief of the analyst creating the report at the time
of creation.  But the Court chose not to do so, and these matters will
have to be clarified by later decisions.
The likely result will ultimately be that, based on Davis and Bry-
ant, the Court will find that at least where there was no legal motiva-
tion for the report or any link in the process it reports, the evidence is
nontestimonial.  For example, it seems likely that if a test were con-
ducted for the primary purposes of diagnosing a patient for treatment
purposes and a report of the test were compiled for that purpose, even
if the doctor knew or could foresee that such a report could potentially
285. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713–14 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537–40
(2009)).
286. Id. at 2714 n.6 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539–40). This, of course,
assumes that the records were made for such neutral purposes, which is not inev-
itably so.  It is not even clear that the hearsay exceptions for business and public
records always requires such neutral purposes, as was recognized by Justice
Scalia. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1174–75 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
287. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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be used at trial, the statements contained in the report would be non-
testimonial.  Focusing on whether the parties primarily intended the
statements to be used as testimony seems consistent with the Court’s
primary purpose analysis as most recently formulated in Bryant.288
9. Should It Matter Whether the Laboratory is Public or
Private?
An open question not answered by Crawford, Davis, Bryant, or any
other case, is whether a statement can be testimonial if there is no
state involvement in the making or receiving of the statement?  In
288. See supra section II.D.  Although the reliability portion of the Bryant test may be
dubious, we agree with the Court that the intention of the person making the
statement is an important factor in determining whether the statement is testi-
monial or not. Id.  Asking whether a report was prepared with prosecutorial use
in mind may be painting with too broad a brush.  Suppose a state crime lab rou-
tinely analyzes the chemical profile of the fertilizer of each in-state manufac-
turer, as the fertilizer leaves each plant.  The crime lab does this because
fertilizer is sometimes used as an ingredient in terrorist bombs.  At the bombing
scene, the chemical profile of the fertilizer, and hence its manufacturing source,
can be ascertained.  The government may be able to use this information to iden-
tify the ultimate purchaser of the fertilizer.  The state lab routinely does these
analyses and makes these records well before any bombings have occurred.
Thus, the state lab does not focus on any particular prosecutions or suspects
when these records are made, but it can still be said that the lab makes these
records with a future prosecutorial use in mind.  Suppose that eventually a bomb-
ing does occur, a defendant is caught, and part of the proof proffered against the
defendant is that the fertilizer was traced to the defendant through the state
crime lab’s chemical profile records.  Accordingly, the state wants to introduce the
state crime lab report as part of its evidence.  While the report was expressly
made for the purpose of possible prosecution, arguably it should not be regarded
as “testimonial” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, since no motive to im-
plicate any particular person could possibly have affected its making (as it was
purely routine and made in a non-adversarial setting before any crime occurred
or a case arose).  Whether there is such a “routine records” or “non-adversarial
records” exception to the Confrontation Clause—as there is to the ban on law
enforcement records in the Public Records hearsay exception under cases such as
United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976)—is another question the
Supreme court is eventually going to have to answer.  A similar situation would
arise where a crime lab is asked to derive a DNA profile from a crime-scene sam-
ple supplied by the police, but the lab is not informed that the police or prosecu-
tion want the profile to yield a particular result, nor is the lab informed of
anything about the case.  In this situation, like the situation discussed above,
arguably no adversarial motive would taint the result, despite the fact that the
analysis is done in connection with a particular crime.  However, this situation
may be distinguishable from the above situation, because in this situation there
is always the possibility that the wishes of the police or prosescution may have
surreptitiously gotten to the lab and influenced the report.  This issue could play
a role in evaluating the private DNA lab used in the Williams case, which is
currently pending before the Supreme Court. See People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d
268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (No. 10-8505); supra notes
249-60 and accompanying text.
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Crawford, Davis, and Bryant, the statements, made by citizens, were
obtained by police.289  In Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming (the forensic
report cases), the statements were made by official agents of the state,
but also to police and prosecutors.290
But what if we remove official involvement entirely in making or
receiving the statement?  For example, what if a citizen makes a state-
ment in his home to a friend, that later is offered in evidence against a
criminal accused via the testimony of the friend? There are sugges-
tions in Crawford, Davis, and Bryant, that both (1) intention (that the
statement be used in the criminal process) of the person making the
statement, and (2) official participation, are significant to a holding
that the Confrontation Clause applies.291  Both factors were present
in those cases which involved police questioning and those which in-
volved forensic reports, where the Court found confrontation
violations.292
But suppose the former (intention) is present, but not the latter
(official involvement).  For example, in the friend-to-friend example,
suppose the friend making the statement means to incriminate the
criminal defendant and hopes the statement will get to police and
prosecutors.293  The cases do not say whether the Confrontation
Clause would be violated.  If distrust of government—the possibility of
government pressure, overreaching, or cheating, in the creation of the
statement—is behind the confrontation requirement, perhaps this ex-
ample is not within the ambit of the Confrontation Clause.  But it is
not clear that the Court feels this way.  In Davis, the Court had an
opportunity to address whether state involvement in making or gar-
nering the statement was indispensible to finding a statement to be
testimonial.294  The statement in Davis was taken from a citizen by a
911 operator.295  Some 911 operators may be employed by private en-
tities and not by the state.  The court could have addressed whether
that kind of independent status would prevent a finding that the
statement was testimonial and therefore would avert a confrontation
violation.  But it did not, because, regardless of that issue, the state-
289. See supra sections II.B–D.
290. See supra section II.E, Part III.
291. See supra sections II.B–D.
292. See supra sections II.B–D.
293. If there is no such contemplation by either friend, then neither of the factors pre-
sent for a confrontation violation are present.  The clearest case of a nontestimo-
nial statement in this regard would be the following friend-to-friend statement,
made in idle conversation: “At 3:50 p.m. Tuesday I saw Fred Jones at the corner
of Main and Sixth Streets.”  It later develops that, unbeknownst to the friends, at
3:50 p.m. on that Tuesday, the bank at Main and Sixth was robbed.  The state-
ment is sought to be offered (via the friend to whom the statement was made) by
the prosecution in the criminal prosecution of Fred Jones for the robbery.
294. See supra section II.C for an in depth discussion of Davis.
295. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 818–19 (2006).
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ment was not testimonial, owing to the fact that it was stated in an
emergency context.296  The court assumed without deciding the issue,
that the 911 operator was an agent of the state or the functional
equivalent of the state297 but did not say whether that would make
any difference in some case where it was not an emergency situation.
It thus did not answer what would be the result if it were not an emer-
gency context (so the statement might be testimonial) and the opera-
tor was totally independent.
Now suppose that the lab in Bullcoming was a private lab instead
of a state lab, in no way under the effective control of the state.  Would
this have removed the “official involvement” factor?  It would not, be-
cause the requesting authority—the people who requested the test
and report—were official entities, the police and prosecutors.  So it
would seem that offering the report without the analyst would still be
a confrontation violation.  The statements in the report would still be
testimonial.
This result is supported by Justice Scalia’s dissent in Bryant.298
He states that even though business records may pass muster with
regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence, if such records were made
even by neutral (non-state) scientific parties providing support for liti-
gation, the Confrontation Clause would bite even if the rules of evi-
dence would not.299  This result is also supported by the fact that the
non-appearing witnesses in the landmark Confrontation Clause cases
discussed in Part II (Crawford, Davis, Bryant) were private individu-
als and the Confrontation Clause applied with full force.300
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has never clearly resolved the
issue.  The Court in Bullcoming could have indicated that a public lab-
oratory, or one under the effective control of the state, is less neutral
than a private laboratory.  If the Court determined that one rationale
for finding scientific reports testimonial is that they are non-neutral
accusations, then the Court might have considered drawing a distinc-
tion between public laboratories (which are presumably less neutral to
state prosecutions) and private laboratories (which are presumably
more neutral to state prosecutions).  However, even if such a distinc-
tion were drawn, there would also have to be an investigation into
whether a private entity were under the effective control of the state
(for instance if the state’s patronage made up a sufficiently large per-
centage of the laboratory’s revenue).  Although the Court chose not to
specifically draw a distinction between public and private laboratories
296. Id. at 822.
297. See supra section II.C.
298. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1174–75 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
299. Id.
300. Also in support of the result is the Court’s tendency to focus on the statement
itself and not on who makes the statement. See supra subsection IV.A.1.
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in Bullcoming, neither did the Court specifically state that no such
distinction exists.  Thus, even after the Court’s opinion, local laborato-
ries continue to lack sufficient notice of their position.
The issue could possibly be addressed when the U.S. Supreme
Court reviews the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Williams.301  In
Williams one of the two labs involved was one of the country’s most
renowned private laboratories, Cellmark of Maryland.302  The Illinois
Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether its private sta-
tus made any difference because in either event the expert witness
was allowed to address the lab reports as part of her opinion.303  If the
U.S. Supreme Court does not agree with this “expert testimony” ratio-
nale when it decides Williams, the Court may have to address the pub-
lic-private question.
For the reasons mentioned above in this section, we believe the
U.S. Supreme Court will not, and should not, draw a distinction be-
tween public and private entities. We do not believe that a private
entity doing a job for the state is significantly more trustworthy, credi-
ble, or reliable than a state entity doing the job. The Court should not
treat a similar statement in a report differently depending on whether
the report was compiled by a public or private laboratory.
B. Implications of Bullcoming Opinion For Law
Enforcement
The nine issues identified above have major consequences for local
and federal law enforcement, as well as for the use of forensic sciences
in criminal trials generally.304  Depending on the Justices’ views on
constitutional interpretation, such practical considerations may be
unimportant.  However, these practical considerations will be ex-
tremely important to states, localities, federal agencies, and lower fed-
eral courts.
To begin, laboratories may simply be unable to meet the needs im-
posed by requiring the specific analyst to testify.  Some laboratories
perform thousands of tests in a year.305  Analysts within those labora-
tories will often have many duties such as training, attending to du-
301. People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090
(2011) (No. 10-8505).
302. Id. at 271.
303. Id. at 277–82.
304. The case will likely have reverberations in many forensics areas including autop-
sies, DNA, toxicology, ballistics, hair and skin analysis, and fingerprinting.  In
his dissenting opinion in Bullcoming, Justice Kennedy was again concerned that
the Court’s opinion would negatively impact law enforcement. See Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
305. See Brief for the NDAA as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 22, Bullcom-
ing, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876) (citing statistics that one Ohio County
Coroner, with a staff of seven forensics professionals and two Ph.D.’s, performed
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ties in the lab, quality assurance, and administration.306  The specific
analyst who compiled the report may very often be unavailable to tes-
tify.  If admissibility now turns on the specific analyst having time to
travel to court, wait for her appearance, and testify, great harm could
be done to prosecutions requiring DNA, toxicology, controlled sub-
stances, and other forensic analysis.307  Prosecutions in certain state
courts will be even more difficult.  In some state courts, trials may be
postponed, moved forward, or plead out at the last second.308  It is
impracticable to believe that a single analyst will be able to keep her
schedule open for months on the chance that any given day will be the
day for her testimony.309  Thus, a good deal of evidence may necessa-
rily be excluded due to unavailability.
Requiring specific analyst testimony may hinder even routine labo-
ratory support for trials.  For instance, the prosecution must account
for the chain of custody in forensic analysis criminal cases.310  Ac-
counting for chain of custody may require representations that an in-
vestigative officer obtained the evidence from the scene of the crime,
that his partner took the evidence to the evidence holding locker, that
a third individual ensured that the evidence was properly sealed in
the holding locker, and so on.311  Should all or most of these individu-
als be required to appear in Court, then even routine chain of custody
representations will become quite problematic.  Although the opinion
of the Court in Melendez-Diaz appears to exempt some individuals
representing the chain of custody,312 the Court’s opinion still seems to
require the prosecution to support, with live testimony, any evidence
the prosecution chooses to offer (on objection by the defense).313  Hold-
ing that confrontation rights attach to certain chain of custody repre-
sentations may go beyond traditional law in this area314 and
discourage prosecutorial efficiency.315
some 35,000 toxicology tests in eight years); see also Brief for the States, supra
note 246, at 5–8.
306. Brief for the States, supra note 246, at 7.
307. Id. at 7–8.
308. Id. at 7.
309. Id. at 7–8.
310. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2546 (2009).
311. Id.
312. See id. at 2561 n.1 (“[W]e do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose
testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of
the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person . . . .”).
313. Id.
314. Justice Kennedy makes this argument in the dissent. See id. at 2546 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
315. If prosecutorial efficiency was severely curtailed, this could impinge upon a de-
fendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.  Amber N. Gremillion, I’ll Be See-
ing You In Court: Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts’ Flawed Decision and Its
Impact On Louisiana, 37 S.U. L. REV. 255, 273 (2010).
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Requiring the specific analyst to testify may also harm special
forensics functions.  For instance, the efficacy of DNA data banks may
be curtailed.316  DNA data bank programs have been successful at
holding DNA and helping solve cold cases which are many years
old.317  In such cold cases, it is unlikely that the original analysts will
be available or even alive.318  If the specific analyst must testify, then
these data bank programs may lose efficacy.319  Similarly, federal
agency support for local prosecutions may be hindered.  For example,
a federal agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
may provide laboratory support for state prosecutions.320  Such sup-
port will be of little use if the FBI agent conducting the analysis can-
not fly to the state in question to appear for testimony.
Requiring the specific analyst to testify may even hinder states
from exercising their basic police powers and instituting public safety
and public policy initiatives.  For instance, if a state was attempting to
institute a zero-tolerance policy toward drinking and driving, the state
may be unable to police such a policy if the blood alcohol analyst had
to appear in every trial for DUI or DWI.321  Likewise, requiring spe-
cific analyst testimony would severely limit the efficacy of drug prose-
cutions, which are often supported by scientific analysis, and
numbered 25,000 in Philadelphia in 2007 alone.322  One commentator
suggests that states may be effectively forced to either decriminalize
certain activities (which the state would otherwise choose to keep
criminal) or plea out many more cases (with the state offering very
generous plea agreements).323  The result for states may be a loss of
effective police power and more criminals evading conviction on
technicalities.324
Finally, even if crime laboratories were able to function effectively,
requiring the specific analyst to testify may create unreasonable fi-
316. Brief for the States, supra note 246, at 10–11.
317. Id. at 10.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2550 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
321. This public policy concern is highlighted by the New Mexico Department of
Health Laboratory Division.  Brief for the New Mexico Department of Health
Laboratory Division as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 30–31,
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09–10876).
322. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  In Louisiana, there
were 17,959 arrests for offenses relating to drugs.  Gremillion, supra note 315, at
272.
323. Bradley W. Hines, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: Forcing America To Pay The
Premium Price For The Nation’s New Confrontation Clause, 21 GEO. MASON U.
C.R. L.J. 123, 147 (2010).
324. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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nancial burdens for the states.325  Analysts at state crime laboratories
are paid out of public money and if such analysts are spending more
time out of the laboratory, then more analysts might need to fill the
gap created by the frequent court appearances of laboratory person-
nel.326  Additionally, there will be pecuniary costs associated with
travel to court and preparation for testimony.327  These costs could be
significant and may result in greatly increased taxes328 or further
harm to state budgets.
Despite these concerns, some knowledgeable sources question
whether such severe consequences would result from requiring the an-
alyst to testify.  Justice Scalia, for instance, doubted that dire conse-
quences would result from making the analyst testify.329  He noted
that several states had already required analyst testimony and the
consequences have not been dire.330  The Petitioners in Bullcoming
and the Amicus Brief of the Public Defender Service in Bullcoming
made a similar point.331  States may also take certain actions to miti-
gate the economic and social costs of analyst testimony in criminal
prosecutions.332  First, some states have adopted a “subpoena system”
whereby the confrontation rights of a defendant in forensics cases are
satisfied by the defendant’s ability to subpoena the specific forensic
analyst.333  Although the Supreme Court seemed to contend that the
subpoena ability is not sufficient for confrontation purposes,334 a re-
versal of that position would certainly mitigate the costs on the states.
Second, some states have enacted notice-and-demand laws, which re-
quire the prosecutor to notify the defense of the intention to use a sci-
entific report and allow the defendant a chance to object to the report’s
use unless the reporter appears in court.335  If the defendant does not
object, the report is admissible without the analyst’s testimony.  These
laws are consistent with even a broad right to confront because under
the Confrontation Clause the defendant has the responsibility to raise
325. Hines, supra note 323, at 142–46.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 2540–42.
330. Id.
331. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 261, at 18; Brief for the Public Defender
Service as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5–15, Bullcoming v. New Mex-
ico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09–10876) [hereinafter Brief for the Public De-
fender Service].
332. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 261, at 18–19; Brief for the Public Defender
Service, supra note 331, at 7–25.
333. Hines, supra note 323, at 150–51.
334. See supra subsection IV.A.6.
335. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540–42; see also Gremillion, supra note 315, at
282–85 (noting two separate types of Notice and Demand statutes).
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an objection on the basis of the Clause.336  These notice-and-demand
laws, then, merely create a time-limited mechanism through which
the defendant can invoke (or waive) her right to confront the forensic
analyst.337  The U.S. Supreme Court seems to have approved such no-
tice and demand laws.338  Third, states could employ technology such
as “two-way video conferencing . . . .”339  If an analyst could ‘testify’
directly through the front-facing camera on his laboratory computer,
the analyst would expend significantly less time and resources in giv-
ing court testimony.  Fourth, and finally, there is often the possibility
of re-testing, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in a portion of her opin-
ion that did not receive full majority subscription.340  If an analyst
whose testimony would be required is gone or dead, in many cases the
substance or material tested will still be available for the state to re-
test with an analyst who is available to be called to testify.
Thus, there is certainly support for the contention that specific an-
alyst testimony is possible without impracticable costs to the states
and federal government.
Although the severity of harm caused by requiring analyst testi-
mony in forensics cases is debated, it is clear that the Court’s interpre-
tation of the scope of confrontation rights and guidance as to how to
meet the rights of defendants has major implications for states, locali-
ties, and even the federal government.  Given the importance of the
Court’s position, the Court’s treatment of law enforcement considera-
tions in its Bullcoming opinion was surprisingly minimal.  Justice
Ginsburg was joined only by Justice Scalia in the portion of her opin-
ion which attempted to address law enforcement policy.341  Even Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s opinion failed to move beyond the reassertion of
arguments employed previously by the Court342 and bare assertions
that the harm would not be severe.343
In our view, the practical consequences for law enforcement are
relevant but not dispositive.  Where the Constitution is clear in grant-
ing criminal defendants the right to cross-examine the specific foren-
sic analyst who performed the analysis, then such clear right in our
336. Hines, supra note 323, at 134. Melendez-Diaz seemed to approve the constitu-
tionality of these laws.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541
(2009).
337. Hines, supra note 323 at 134.
338. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541.
339. Hines, supra note 323 at 154–57.
340. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2011).
341. Id. at 2709, 2717–19.
342. For instance, Justice Ginsburg makes the argument that notice-and-demand
statutes can minimize the harm to law enforcement and that very few cases actu-
ally result in trial proceedings. Id. at 2718.
343. For instance, Justice Ginsburg suggests that in states which require analyst tes-
timony to support scientific reports, “the sky has not fallen.” Id. at 2719.
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view does and will trump these practical considerations.  However, we
are not persuaded that the Confrontation Clause envisages in all cir-
cumstances an absolute right to confront the specific analyst or all
specific analysts.  In unclear circumstances, the practical conse-
quences are relevant.  Creating an unqualified right to confront the
specific analyst in all the situations discussed in this Article would too
severely curtail law enforcement and the protection to citizens that
law enforcement affords.  In the final Part of this Article, we will pre-
sent our conclusions.
V. CONCLUSION
While it is true that practical concerns such as the needs of law
enforcement cannot trump an individual’s clear constitutional right to
confrontation,344 it is also true that where the constitutional right is
not clear, such concerns can properly influence filling in the contours
of that right, in our view.
We believe that the practical law enforcement concerns discussed
above militate in favor of a limited surrogate witness and expert wit-
ness exception to Melendez-Diaz’s and Bullcoming’s requirement that
the prosecution cannot use a forensic report without the specific ana-
lyst being presented by the prosecution for testimony.  The exception
should allow a properly qualified surrogate witness or expert witness,
who has a sufficiently strong foundation or basis, to testify in place of
the analyst, at least if the analyst is unavailable.
Bullcoming could have taken the bull by the horns and said
whether such exceptions will be recognized and if so, what their gen-
eral parameters are, as it could have with other of the issues discussed
herein.  This would have been desirable from the standpoint of provid-
ing much needed guidance to all the participants in the process, but
perhaps the guidance would have been ill thought out at this early
stage of developing jurisprudence on the issue.  Presumably owing to
concerns of this nature, the Court did not take the opportunity.  It was
not necessary to do so on the facts345—there was no way the testifying
witness could have met the qualifications of any reasonable version of
the exceptions.
We are fairly confident, however, that the Court will find it neces-
sary to pronounce on these exceptions in the not-too-distant future,
and that the Justices will recognize some version of one, or both, of
these exceptions.
The purpose of this Article was to highlight the issues raised by,
and potential consequences of, the applicability (or inapplicability) of
the Confrontation Clause to forensic scientists creating purportedly
344. See supra notes 342–43 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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objective reports, in various situations.  Part I introduced the Article.
Part II provided the necessary case law history such that the issues
were placed in their historical contexts.  Part III introduced the
Bullcoming case.  Finally, Part IV first identified a number of issues
which we believe required clarification prior to the Bullcoming deci-
sion, then discussed the extent to which the Court adequately clarified
and addressed each issue, and finally highlighted the importance of
these issues in terms of individual rights, forensics and law enforce-
ment policy.
Analysis of the relevant cases and materials led us to believe that
the Court will eventually have to more clearly instruct participants in
the process as to the applicability of the Confrontation Clause to foren-
sic reports like those involved in Bullcoming and variations thereof.
The Court in Bullcoming could have resisted the impulse to answer
only the narrow question before it and resolved some of the confusion
that surrounds many of the other questions in the area of forensic re-
porting and confrontation rights.  The Court could have specifically
addressed and more fully clarified the issues that we have raised in
this Article, which would have provided much needed guidance to all
involved in the system.  On the other hand, there are strong consider-
ations that counsel judicial restraint and a gradual exposition of the
issues, and these considerations appear to have won out in Bullcom-
ing.  Nevertheless, we would hope that the Court will clarify the re-
maining issues in future Confrontation Clause opinions as rapidly as
possible, consistent with good judging.  Although evidence itself—
much to the chagrin of CSI’s Grissom—may not always be explicitly
clear, the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of evidence law and
constitutional rights should be, at least after a decent period of
gestation.
